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Article 2

Gift Tax: Valuation Difficulties and Gift Completion
Mitchell M. Gans*
I.

Introduction

Fair market value is the basis upon which transfer taxes are imposed. While ascertaining value is easy for some transfers, it is frequently an imprecise and difficult process. Occasionally, the
transferred item is incapable of valuation--either because the transfer is subject to a contingency having a probability of occurrence that
cannot be actuarially determined or because some aspect of the
transferred item prevents even valuation experts from rendering a
reasonable judgment.
Two formats are available for taxing these difficult-to-value
transfers. The first alternative is to tax the transfer at the time the
transferor severs his control, the point at which transfers are generally subject to taxation. Using this format, the determination of
value is necessarily speculative. That is, the process requires taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service, and the courts to hazard the best
guess that the circumstances will permit. The second alternative is to
defer the imposition of the transfer tax until the difficult-to-value aspect of the transfer becomes susceptible to more accurate valuation.
In the estate tax context, the former alternative has generally
been applied because, unlike the latter, it makes it possible to compute the estate tax within a reasonable time after death, facilitating
prompt estate administration. In the gift tax setting, however, a valuation-difficulty rule has evolved, which in some situations defers the
computation and payment of the tax where the gift is difficult to
value. Since this deferral approach allows the tax computation to be
made when valuation is no longer difficult, its application increases
valuation accuracy. This article will argue that this increase in accuracy warrants a more expansive application of the valuation-difficulty rule than has thus far been the case.
It has been suggested, however, that the valuation-difficulty rule
ought to be categorically rejected in the gift tax context as well because its application would produce results that are incongruous with
conventional gift tax theory. Ordinarily, a gift is deemed complete
*

Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. B.B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974,

Hofstra University. Member, New York Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of his research assistant, Philip Rogers.

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[February 1983]

and the tax is immediately imposed upon value at the time the donor
severs his control over the gift. The gift tax system therefore normally excludes post-severance events from the tax base. The valuation-difficulty rule, on the other hand, effects a deferral and takes
post-severance events into account. This deviation in theory produced by the valuation-difficulty rule can be minimized, it will be
suggested, by excluding all post-severance events from the valuation
process other than those that merely reveal what was unascertainable
at the time of severance.
In some instances, application of the valuation-difficulty rule
would create the potential for tax-free wealth transfers. This possibility for abuse can be averted by applying the rule selectively-only
to those gifts that do not have this potential inherent in them--or, as
will be proposed, by adopting a death-completion rule requiring all
gifts made subject to the rule to be viewed as becoming complete no
later than the date of the donor's death.
If this death-completion proposal is adopted, the increased accuracy afforded by the valuation-difficulty rule is accomplished without
permitting transferors to abuse the system, while the deviation from
conventional principles is minimized.
II.

Formation of the Valuation-Difficulty Rule
A.

Enforceable Obligation to Make a Gift

The transfer of an interest in property becomes subject to gift
tax when the donor relinquishes his control over the property.'
Where, however, the donor divides his transfer into two time
frames-first contractually obligating 2 himself to make the transfer
and then discharging his obligation by making the actual transfer of
the property-a timing question arises: is the gift complete when the
contractual obligation is undertaken or when the property is transferred in discharge of the obligation? The courts have concluded
that the gift is complete when the donor's contractual obligation be3
comes enforceable under state law.
This question resolved, it became necessary to decide whether
the gift should be deemed complete where the contractual obligation
1 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1958).
2 See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303
(1945).
3 Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953); Estate of Copley v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17 (1950), afd, 194 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1952); Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d
861 (2d Cir. 1949), reo'don other grounds, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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had a contingent nature. In Rosenthal v. Commissioner,4 the donor entered into a separation agreement with his wife in which it was
agreed that he would make certain payments to his children in future
years. 5 The donor's obligation to make these payments, however,
was contingent upon the death of his mother during his lifetime.
The Commissioner argued that because the obligation was contingent, the gift would not be complete until the donor discharged his
obligation by making the required payments. The court, rejecting
this argument, held that since the contingency was susceptible to actuarial valuation,' the gift became subject to tax when the enforceable contractual obligation was undertaken, at the time the separation
agreement was executed.
The Rosenthal court did indicate in dicta that where the nature
of the contingency renders the contractual obligation incapable of
valuation, the gift is not complete at the time the obligation is undertaken. The court illustrated this principle by referring to its earlier
decision in Ciy Bank Fanners Trust Co. v. Hoey. There, the court held
that an enforceable obligation embodied in a judicial decree subject
to modification did not effect a completed gift until payments were
made pursuant to the decree, for the court's power of modification
made it impossible to value the gift at the time the decree became
effective. 8
Thus, at least insofar as the Rosenthal court is concerned, a gift is
not complete at the time that a contingent contractual obligation is
undertaken if the contingency is such that the probability of its outcome cannot be actuarially determined. The IRS adopted this principle in Revenue Ruling 69-346. 9 There, a husband and wife,
residing in a community property state, entered into an agreement
that required the wife to transfer her one-half interest in their com4 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953).
5 The court concluded that the fact that the agreement arose in the divorce context did
not preclude application of the gift tax. Id
6 See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943) (actuarial principles applied in determining the value of the donor's reversion, which was contingent upon his outliving the life
tenant).
7 101 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939).
8 See a/so Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1059 (1960). There, a wife discharged an
obligation that her husband owed to a bank by delivering to the bank a note in the amount of
$205,000. Because the wife's net worth was only $15,780, the court held that her delivery of
the note did not effect a completed gift, reasoning that there was no certainty at the time of
the note's delivery that she would discharge it. Bradford may be read as holding that where a
contingency makes the value of a contractual obligation speculative, the gift is not complete
merely because the obligation is enforceable.
9 1969-1 C.B. 227.
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munity property to a trust to be created under the husband's will.
Although the agreement became enforceable when it was executed,
the IRS ruled that the wife did not make a taxable gift until the
husband's death, 10 when it first became possible to calculate the
value of her gift." The IRS formulated the rule as follows:
[T]he effective date of the gift for Federal gift tax purposes is the
date upon which a promise to make a future transfer becomes enforceable under State law, and not the date upon which an actual
is susceptible of valutransfer of property is made, provided the gift
2
ation at the time it becomes enforceable.'
B.

Valuation-LDiftlulty Rule Expanded to Non-Contractual Gifts

Reiterating this formulation in several rulings,13 the IRS has
sought somewhat subtly to expand the application of this rule beyond the scope of Revenue Ruling 69-346. In Revenue Ruling 79231,14 for example, an employee assigned his rights under an employer-provided group life insurance plan to his spouse. The assignment included not only his rights under the policy then in force but
also his rights under any policy subsequently acquired by his employer. After the employee executed the assignment, the employer
acquired a new group policy, changing its insurance carrier. The
IRS ruled that the employee's gift of his rights under the new policy
would not be complete until the employer acquired the new policy,
even if it were assumed that the employee's conveyance of his rights
under the new policy had been enforceable under state law upon his
earlier execution of the assignment. 15 The IRS's citation of Revenue
10 Since a donor's retention of dominion and control over a gift renders the gift incomplete, Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-2 (1958), and since, in the ruling, the wife's dominion and control
continued after the agreement was entered into-by spending or saving, she would affect the
amount of community property-it is arguable that the conclusion that the gift was incomplete until the husband's death was not dependent upon a finding of valuation difficulty. See
Macris, Open Valuationand the Completed Transfer- A Problem Area in FederalGo2 Taxation, 34 TAX
L. REv. 273, 294 (1979).
11 While the IRS did not specify what contingency made the wife's gift difficult to evaluate, presumably it was the inability to determine, at the time the agreement was entered into,
the value of community property that they would own at the time of the husband's death.
12 1969-1 C.B. 227.
13 Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408; Rev. Rul. 75-71,
1975-1 C.B. 309; Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-2 C.B. 323; Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344. See
also Ltr. Rul. 8140016; Ltr. Rul. 8109032; Ltr. Rul. 7944009; Ltr. Rul. 7935013; Ltr. Rul.
7910004.
14 1979-2 C.B. 323. But see Rev. Rul. 80-289, 1980-2 C.B. 270 (revoking Rev. Rul. 79231).
15 The ultimate conclusion reached by the IRS was that since gift tax principles indicated that the transfer was not complete until the new policy was purchased, the transfer
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Ruling 69-346 makes it apparent that the IRS premised its conclusion on its inability to calculate the value of the employee's rights
under the policy, since the policy had not yet been purchased.
Superficially, the IRS reliance on Revenue Ruling 69-346 seems
appropriate. However, Revenue Ruling 79-231 is distinguishable
from Revenue Ruling 69-346 in one respect: while the latter ruling
involved a donor's contractual promise to make a transfer of property
in the future, the employee in Revenue Ruling 79-231 severed all
connections to the gift at the time of assignment, leaving him with no
rights under any subsequently acquired policy and, of course, no obligation to make any further property transfers.
One must surmise that, ignoring this distinction, the IRS concluded that the valuation-difficulty rule adopted in Revenue Ruling
69-346 for gifts promised in an enforceable contract should be extended to gifts of all types, not just those of the contractual variety.
In other words, the valuation-difficulty rule of Revenue Ruling 69346, first enunciated by the Rosenthal court, transcends the Rosenthal
factual setting of a promise to make a gift, at least according to the
IRS in Revenue Ruling 79-231.
III.
A.

Scope of the Valuation-Difficulty Rule

Valuation-DiftculoRule Capable of Producing Tax Avoidance

To illustrate the consequence of this extension, assume that a
taxpayer owns a mineral interest located somewhere in the Persian
Gulf region. Assume further that the country in which the interest is
located is involved in an incandescent war. If the country within
which the interest is located does not prevail, the victorious countries
may confiscate the interest, depriving the taxpayer of his ownership
in the minerals without any compensation. While in this precarious
position, the taxpayer makes an outright gift of the mineral
6
interest.
If, as the IRS seemingly suggested in Revenue Ruling 79-231,
the valuation-difficulty rule is to be applied in the non-contractual
context, the gift is incomplete, since its value is contingent upon the
outcome of the war and, therefore, impossible to calculate with any
certainty.' 7 Putting aside for the moment the wisdom from the policy viewpoint of any rule that would render this gift incomplete,
should similarly be deemed incomplete for I.R.C. § 2035 (1976) purposes until the purchase
of the new policy was effected.
16 For a similar hypothetical, see Macris, supra note 10, at 299.
17 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2, which provides that a gift is complete when the donor
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there are difficult practical problems inherent in such a rule in the
context of this illustration. If the taxpayer dies after having conveyed his ownership in the mineral interest but prior to the gift having become complete18 in the tax sense, the transfer of the minerals
will have escaped transfer taxation, even though the value of the
minerals may eventually prove to be substantial. At the time of the
conveyance of his rights in the mineral interest, the taxpayer is not
deemed to have made a gift by virtue of the valuation-difficulty rule;
at the time of the taxpayer's death, the mineral interest cannot be
included in his gross estate, -for he will have relinquished all of his
control and rights with respect to the property prior to his death. 19
The difficulty here is that although the gift will be deemed complete
when its value becomes ascertainable at the conclusion of the war,20
by our hypothesis that will not occur until the taxpayer has died.
Since, under the present transfer tax system, the gift tax does not
apply to any transfer when the transferor is dead at the time the gift
22
becomes complete, 2 1 the gift tax cannot apply here.
Contrast these difficulties, engendered by application of the valuation-difficulty rule in the non-contractual context, with the results
that stem from application of the rule to a contractual gift, such as
that in Revenue Ruling 69-346. There, the wife contractually obligated herself to make a gift upon the death of her husband of property that would not be determinable until his death. As will be
recalled, the IRS ruled that because of valuation problems, the gift
was not complete until the husband died. Unlike the hypothesized
conveyance of the mineral interest, there was no potential for the
complete avoidance of transfer tax created by application of the valuation-difficulty rule in Revenue Ruling 69-346. If the wife had died
after having entered into the enforceable agreement but prior to the
tax gift having become complete (i.e., at her husband's death), she
would not have made any transfers pursuant to the agreement, since
it required her to make the transfer only if she were to survive her
relinquishes his dominion and control over the gift. Interestingly, the regulation does not
provide for a deferral where the gift is difficult to value.
18 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227 (the IRS indicated that a gift subject to the
rule becomes complete when value can be ascertained). But see note 94 nlfra.
19 I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2036, 2038 (1976). See R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIr TAXATION 10-22, 10-23 (4th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as STEPHENS]; Macris, supra note 10, at 299.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2() (1958). See STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 10-25 n. 110. But see
note 60 infra and accompanying text.
22 But see Macris, supa note 10, at 299.
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husband. Nevertheless, all of her assets, including those that she
transferred pursuant to the agreement, would have been includible
in her gross estate. Having survived her husband, she was subject to
gift tax; had she failed to survive, the estate tax would have been
applicable.
Thus, deferring the taxable gift because of valuation problems
will not create the potential for complete avoidance of transfer tax in
the context of a promise to make a gift contained in an enforceable
contract. Such a contractual gift will become subject to gift tax
when valuation can be accomplished, 23 or, if the donor dies prior to
the completion of the gift, the property that is the subject of the gift
will be included in the donor's gross estate, the donor having control
24
over it at death.
In Revenue Ruling 79-231, the IRS's extension of the valuationdifficulty rule to the non-contractual gift there at issue 25 did not produce any potential for transfer tax avoidance. If the employee had
died after having made an assignment of his rights under any subsequently acquired group policy but before the employer acquired a
new policy, there would have been no transfer tax with regard to any
such subsequently acquired policy. The gift would have been
deemed incomplete by virtue of the valuation-difficulty rule, and
since no such policy would have been in existence at the employee's
death, it could not have been included in his estate. This, however, is
a sensible result, for neither the employee nor his assignee would
have enjoyed the benefits of a subsequent policy, the employee hav26
ing died prior to his employer's purchase of any such policy.
23 Presumably, this will occur when the contractual obligation is discharged.
24 I.R.C. § 2033 (1976). No deduction will be permitted under I.R.C. § 2053, inasmuch
as contractual claims against an estate are only deductible if the decedent received consideration in return for undertaking the claim. I.R.C. § 2053(c)(1)(A) (1976). Since a contractual
promise to make a gift is not supported by consideration in the tax sense (though, perhaps,
consideration would be found present under state law), no deduction is allowable for any
claim founded on such a contractual promise. Se, e.g., Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945);
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
25 Perhaps Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, should be viewed as the IRS's initial attempt to extend the rule. There, a father made an interest-free loan on a demand basis to a
corporation wholly owned by his son. The IRS ruled that since the value of such a loan was
impossible to determine at the time that the funds were lent, the gift of the use of the money
would not be complete until the close of each taxable unit (i.e., the calendar quarter) during
which the loan remained outstanding. Thus, although the interest-free loan in the ruling was
not a promise to make a gift embodied in a contract, the IRS relied on the valuation-diffi"culty rule. See also Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11th Cir. 1982). But see Crown
v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
26 Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, is perhaps another example of a non-contractual gift
made subject to the valuation-difficulty rule without the potential for creating transfer tax
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In sum, applying the valuation-difficulty rule to a contractual
gift does not pose any tax-avoidance problems. On the other hand,
applying the valuation-difficulty rule in the context of a non-contractual gift will, in some instances, precipitate transfer tax avoidance,
while in other cases, it will not. The gift of the mineral interest in the
hypothetical posited earlier could result in a complete avoidance of
transfer tax if the gift were subjected to the valuation-difficulty rule;
in contrast, the assignment of rights under a yet-to-be-acquired policy in Revenue Ruling 79-231 did not create any tax-avoidance
27
problems when the assignment was analyzed under the rule.
B.

Tax-Avoidance PotentialShapes Valuation-Ditulpy Rule

Perhaps, concern with tax avoidance potential led the court in
Galt v. Commissioner28 to its rejection of the rule, at least in the context
of the facts before it. In Galt, the taxpayer owned a parcel of land,
which had produced little, if any, income for the taxpayer during his
entire period of ownership. Then in 1939 he leased the property to a
county fair organization, which constructed a grandstand and a
track for harness racing on the property. The race track was not
successful, and the taxpayer continued to receive little income from
the property.
In 1945 the state in which the property was located legalized
pari-mutuel harness racing, enabling the taxpayer to lease the property to a trotting association. In February 1946, the taxpayer executed such a lease, providing that the taxpayer would receive, as
rent, a fixed number of dollars each year plus a percentage of the bets
wagered at the race track. On the same day on which the taxpayer
executed the lease, he assigned to each of his three sons a twenty
percent share in the contingent portion of the rent. In October 1946
the trotting association made its first payment of the contingent portion of the rent; each of the three sons received twenty percent, and
the taxpayer received the remaining forty percent.
The Commissioner argued that no gift was made to the sons unavoidance. The interest-free loan in that ruling (see note 25 supra) was held to be an incomplete gift at the time of the loan's consummation. Presumably, as the father allowed the loan
to remain outstanding each day, the gift was complete to the extent of the value of the use of
the funds for that day. According to the IRS, if the father were to die prior to demanding
repayment, the value of the use of the money for each day prior to his death would constitute
a gift. Thus, applying the valuation-difficulty rule in this context does not create any transfer
tax avoidance.
27 See STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 10-22, 10-23; Macris, supra note 10, at 299, 300.
28 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955).
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til they received their first payment in October 1946.29 According to
the Commissioner, additional gifts would be deemed completed as
the lessee made each additional rental payment. The taxpayer, on
the other hand, argued that the gift was completed in February 1946,
when he made the assignment to his sons. Supporting his argument,
the taxpayer introduced expert testimony in the trial court to the
effect that the assigned rental payments had a value of $34,09030 as
of February 1946, when the assignment was made. The Commissioner did not offer any valuation evidence.
The court held that a taxable gift in the amount of $34,090 was
completed in February.3 ' The court's decision not to apply the valuation-difficulty rule could perhaps be explained on the ground that
there was unrefuted evidence before the court of the value of the
contingent rental payment. On the other hand, there was an admission by the taxpayer in the record to the effect that the value was
32
speculative and not readily susceptible to calculation.
The court, however, did not rest its holding on the narrow factual ground that the lease had an ascertainable value as of February
1946. Instead of temporizing in this manner, the court explicitly concluded that valuation difficulties should have no bearing on the timing of a taxable gift:
It is true, we think, that the value of the gift as represented by the
assignment which petitioner [taxpayer] made to his sons was specu-

lative, uncertain and contingent upon future developments ...
Even so, this is an immaterial
factor in determining whether a gift
was made at that time.3 3
The court relied on two different rationales to support this seemingly categorical rejection of the valuation-difficulty rule. First, the
court cited Smith v. Shaughnessy 4 for the proposition that valuation
difficulties should not prevent application of the gift tax.3 5 Second,
the court was of the view that the concept of "transfer," as contemplated in the Code and regulations, is inconsistent with any notion
that a transfer could be incomplete merely because of valuation
29 The aggregate payment to the three sons in October 1946 was $23,923.83. 216 F.2d at
44. This, in the Commissioner's view, was the amount of the 1946 taxable gift.
30 Although the taxpayer did offer this expert testimony,.he had admitted in a letter to
his sons that accompanied the assignment that the value of the gift was speculative and impossible to calculate. Id at 51.
31 Id
32 See note 30 rufira.
33 216 F.2d at 50.
34 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
35 216 F.2d at 50.
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difficulties.3 6
1.

Smith and Robinette

Although Smith v. Shaughnessy did contain language suggesting
that the gift tax should apply to the transfer of an interest subject to
contingencies, 37 the Supreme Court's companion decision in Robinette
v. Helvering38 hints that the view it took of contingencies in Smith v.
Shaughnessy should be limited to contingencies that are susceptible to
valuation. In Smith, the taxpayer funded a trust, which created a life
estate in his wife. The taxpayer's reversion was to become possessory
only if he was living at the time of his wife's death. If the taxpayer
failed to survive his wife, the remainder would become subject to a
power of appointment exercisable by his wife. The government con39
ceded that the value of the reversion was not subject to the gift tax,
and the taxpayer conceded that the value of the life estate was subject to the tax. Thus, the only issue before the Court was whether the
value of the remainder, which was contingent upon the taxpayer's
failure to survive his wife, was a taxable gift. The Court held that
the value of the contingent remainder was subject to the gift tax. In
Robinette, the Court revealed the premise that was essential to its decision in Smith: the contingency in Smith was readily susceptible to
actuarial valuation. The Robinette Court did not explicitly indicate
that the remainder in Smith was susceptible to valuation. However,
the Court pointed out that the reversion in Smith was contingent
upon the grantor surviving his wife and was, therefore, susceptible to
valuation. 4° Since the contingency attached to the remainder in
Smith was the mirror image of the contingency attached to the reversion, it too was susceptible to valuation.
Whether the gift tax should be applied where the contingency is
not susceptible to valuation was not discussed in either Robinette or
Smith. Thus, the citation to Smith by the Galt court for the proposi36
37

Id at 50-51.
The court extracted the following from Smith z. Shaughnessy:
Even though these concepts of property and value may be slippery and elusive
they cannot escape taxation so long as they are used in the world of business. The
language of the gift tax statute, "property.. . real or personal, tangible or intangible", is broad enough to include property, however conceptual or contingent.
216 F.2d at 50 (quoting Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. at 180).
38 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
39 318 U.S. at 188. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2; Peschel, The Impact of Aidaty Standards
on Federal Taxation of Grantor Trusts. Illusion and Inconsisteng, 1979 DuKE L.J. 709, 712; STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 10-23 n.102.
40 318 U.S. at 188.
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tion that a gift subject to contingencies that cannot be valued is nev41
ertheless subject to the gift tax is misplaced.
2.

The "Transfer" Concept

As an alternative ground for its holding, the Galt court reasoned
that the Code imposes the gift tax on a "transfer of property" 42 and
that the taxpayer made the transfer when he conveyed his rights
under the lease to his sons, not when his sons received the rental payments. Commentators have also suggested that the Code contemplates that determining when a "transfer of property" occurs is to be
43
accomplished without regard to any valuation difficulties.
Examining this proposition requires a return to Rosenthal.
There, the taxpayer undertook an enforceable obligation to make a
gift. Although the obligation was subject to contingencies, the court
41 In Robinette, the taxpayer funded a trust, retaining a reversion that would become
possessory if certain difficult-to-value contingencies occurred. The Court held that the reversion was subject to the gift tax. One might read this case as establishing the proposition that
the transfer of an interest that is contingent and not readily subject to valuation constitutes a
taxable gift. However, unlike the facts before the court in Galt (i.e., the transfer of property
was difficult to value), the value of the property transferred by the donor was unquestionably
ascertainable. It was only the reversion retained by the donor that was difficult to value. In
these circumstances, the Court concluded that since the donor had the burden of proving the
value of the retained interest and since the donor created the contingencies that made valuation difficult, it was appropriate to impose the gift tax on the value of the property transferred
into the trust, disregarding the difficult-to-calculate value of the reversion. Thus, the Court
did not address the question whether the gift tax should apply to the transfer of property not
capable of actuarial valuation, but only decided that the taxpayer failed to sustain his burden
of proving the value of the reversion.
Perhaps the Robinette analysis should be extended to the transfer of a property interest
difficult to value. After all, it is the taxpayer who chooses the property he wishes to transfer; if
he cannot prove the value of it, he should suffer the consequences, as the taxpayer did in
Robinette. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that the government is equally unable to establish a value. Cf. Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1981);
Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1979) (in both cases, the courts indicated a willingness to depart from the normal burden-of-proof rules unless the government
first established that its proposed deficiency had some validity). At least in Robinette the government was able to assert a value for the property transferred into the trust, leaving it to the
taxpayer to prove the value of the reversion. Where, however, neither side is able to establish
the value of the subject of the transfer, it may be inappropriate to apply Robinette.
42 The court cited § 1000(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor of
I.R.C. § 2511(a) (1976). The court also cited Regulation 108, Sec. 86.2(a), the predecessor of
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c). 216 F.2d at 50.
43 STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 10-21 (suggesting that the IRS's application of the valuation-difficulty rule is a deviation from conventional theory, though a sensible one); Macris,
supra note 10, at 301 (arguing that I.R.C. § 2512 and Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) dictate the
conclusion that valuation difficulties should not impact on the analysis of a gift's timing);
Wolk, The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate and Gif Tax Anomaly, 66 MINN. L. REV. 229, 273
(1982).

504
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held that the transfer was complete when the obligation was undertaken, suggesting, however, that it would not have viewed the gift as
complete at that time had the contingency rendered the obligation
incapable of valuation. Indeed, the Rosenthal court distinguished the
facts before it from those in its earlier decision in Czty Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Hoey,44 where it had held that the transfer was not complete until the obligation was discharged because the obligation was
subject to difficult-to-value contingencies at the time it was undertaken.4 5 The Rosenthal court viewed the concept as a flexible one:
where an enforceable obligation is susceptible to valuation, the transfer occurs when the obligation becomes enforceable; on the other
hand, where the obligation is contingent and cannot be readily valued, the transfer occurs when the obligation is discharged. The
premise underlying this view is that Congress could not have intended to impose the gift tax on the undertaking of a contingent obligation incapable of valuation. Rather, it would be preferable, for
administrative convenience, to impose the tax when property presumably having an ascertainable value is actually transferred in dis46
charge of the obligation.
Is the Galt court's conclusion that a "transfer of property" was
effected when the taxpayer made an assignment of his contingent
and difficult-to-value rights inconsistent with the Rosenthal court's
flexible approach? Unfortunately, Galt did not cite Rosenthal, leaving
it for us to speculate about its view of the Rosenthal analysis.
While the statute and regulations may be viewed as ambiguous
when applied to a contractual gift, this ambiguity evanesces in the
context of non-contractual gifts. The gift in Galt was not one of the
contractual variety. The taxpayer did not make a binding promise
to make a transfer of property in the future. Rather, the taxpayer
made a valid assignment of his rights under the lease, thereby immediately shifting to his sons ownership of the assigned rights. Once the
assignment was accomplished, the taxpayer had no further transfer
to make and no further obligation to his sons. In these circumstances, it is difficult to quarrel with the court's conclusion that the
"transfer of property" occurred at the time the assignment was made.
So, Galt is not inconsistent with Rosenthal--one involved a contrac44 101 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939).
45 Id at 10. See notes 7-8 s-upra and accompanying text.
46 Moreover, applying the valuation-difficulty rule in the contractual-gift context does
not create the potential for transfer-tax avoidance. In the non-contractual context, however,
application of the rule could create such potential. See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying
text.
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tual gift, and the other did not. 47
Thus, with respect to contractual gifts, there is enough latitude
in the statute and regulations to find a "transfer of property" either
at the time the obligation is undertaken or at the time the obligation
is discharged-the selection being a function of whether the contingency and hence the obligation can be valued at the time the obligation is undertaken. On the other hand, in the non-contractual gift
setting, the statute seemingly provides much less leeway, appearing
on the surface at least to require imposition of the tax when the
transfer is made even if valuation difficulties are present at that time.
But what of the judicial gloss imposed upon a similarly unequivocal income tax statute by the Supreme Court in Bumet v. Logan?48
There, the taxpayer sold stock in a corporation that indirectly owned
an interest in minerals. The sales price was contingent in part upon
the. amount of minerals that would be extracted. Although the income tax statute 49 provided, as it does now,5 0 that the gain upon the
sale of an asset should be computed by subtracting the taxpayer's
47 The Galt court did use language, however, suggesting that the gift tax be imposed
when enforceable rights are created in the donee without regard to whether valuation difficulties are present:
We think it is hardly open to dispute but that petitioner's sons as donees at the time
of the execution of the lease and assignments acquired a property right, that is, a
right to receive income, a right to participate in the rental proceeds. The manner of
the enforcement of that right or what it might mean to the donees in the future is of
no consequence. As was stated in Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106, 111 . . .
"We, however, think that the gift tax statute is concerned with the source of rights,
not with the manner in which rights at some distant time may be enforced. Remedies for enforcement will vary from state to state. It is 'the transfer' of the property
with which the gift tax statute is concerned, not the sanctions which the law supplies to enforce transfers."
216 F.2d at 50.
In quoting from Harris, did the court intend to indicate that the gift tax can never be
applied to the discharge of a contractual gift-i.e., that, contrary to Rosenthal, in the contractual-gift context, the gift is always complete at the time the obligation is undertaken regardless of valuation difficulties? The answer must be no. First, the court did not have before it a
contractual gift. Second, if the court had decided to posit a contractual gift, one would think
that at least a citation of Rosenthal, decided the previous year, would have been appropriate.
Finally, the quotation from Har-is does not even deal with the timing of gifts. Rather, the
Court in Harris was concerned with whether the transfers there at issue were founded upon a
promise or agreement within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2053, which would have made it appropriate to apply the gift tax; or upon some marital duty under state law, which would have
made it inappropriate to apply the gift tax. In other words, the language quoted from Harris
related to whether or not the taxpayer's transfer was an appropriate subject for the gift tax,
not the timing of a gift.
48 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
49 Revenue Act of 1918, c.18, § 214(a), 40 Stat. 1066 (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a)).
50 I.R.C. § 1001 (1976).
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basis in the asset from the sum of the cash and thefair market value of
otherproperty received by the taxpayer, the Court held that the taxpayer,
who reported on a cash basis, was not required to include the contingent portion of the sales price as income until the taxpayer received
it.5 1 In effect, the Court concluded that the purchaser's contractual
obligation was too contingent to be considered property within the
meaning of the income tax statute. 52 Obviously, the Court was influenced by the administrative inconvenience it perceived in a contrary
53
rule:
The liability for income tax ultimately can be fairly determined
without resort to mere estimates, assumptions and speculation.
When the profit, if any,
is actually realized, the taxpayer will be
54
required to respond.

A similar judicial gloss could be as easily employed in the gift
tax context. Just as the Code imposes an income tax on thefair market
value of the property received as a result of a sale,55 it imposes a gift tax
on the fair market value of the property transferred.5 6 Identical administrative convenience concerns loom in both contexts:57 if the value of the
property transferred or received is too contingent to value, it is impractical to impose a tax based on value before it becomes ascertainable. Yet, the Galt court refused to borrow the Burnet v. Logan5 8 mode
51 More specifically, the Court held that the taxpayer should be permitted to exclude
from income all sales receipts until the taxpayer fully recovered his basis; payments received
after basis had been recovered would then be fully taxable. 283 U.S. at 312.
52 Congress has now indicated that the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in
Burnet v. Logan should be restricted to "those rare and extraordinary cases involving sales for
a contingent price where the fair market value of the purchaser's obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained." See S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4696, 4719 (1980). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a); Rev. Rul. 58402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
53 Cf Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1970), afd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
There, the court held that the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership received in return
for services is not taxable upon its acquisition when its value is not readily ascertainable. But
see Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in PartnershipProfits in Considerationfor Services: The Diamond
Case, 27 TAx L. REV. 161 (1972), where the author suggests that the taxability of the profits
interest should not turn upon whether or not its value is ascertainable at the time of its
acquisition.
54 283 U.S. at 412-13.
55 I.R.C.'§ 1001 (1976).
56 I.R.C. § 2512 (1976).
57 The Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan did impliedly suggest that, in the estate tax
context, it might be necessary to place some value upon the estate at the time of death (or on
the alternate-valuation date) even if valuation difficulties were present. This difference in
treatment between the estate tax and the income tax is presumably made necessary by the
policy objective of facilitating prompt estate administration. See note 91 zkfra.
58 The court did not even cite Burnet v. Logan.
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of analysis, holding instead that the statutory concept "transfer of
property" does not permit a deferral merely because the Value of the
gift is difficult to calculate.
On policy grounds, the Galt court's rejection of Burnet v. Logan
was sensible. If the court had permitted a deferral, when would the
taxpayer have been required to pay transfer tax on the assignment of
his rights under the lease to his sons? Presumably, the taxpayer
would have been required to pay the gift tax as the value of the lease
rights became ascertainable, that is, when the lessee made rental payments to the sons. But if the taxpayer had died before the lessee had
made all of the payments required by the lease, those payments made
after the taxpayer's death would have been subject to neither the
estate tax5 9 nor the gift tax.60 This potential for transfer tax avoidance obviously led the court to its rejection of a valuation-difficulty
rule insofar as non-contractual gifts are concerned.
In sum, then, the gift tax statute as presently drafted can be
made to accommodate a valuation-difficulty rule in the context of
non-contractual as well as contractual gifts.6 1 However, the potential
for transfer tax avoidance inherent in non-contractual gifts if the rule
62
is applied to them argues against its application in this context.
C. Gifts Deemed Complete at Donor's Death: Revenue Ruling 81-31
The valuation-difficulty rule could be extended to non-contractual gifts without producing any tax avoidance were the Code
amended to provide a mechanism whereby the gift tax would be imposed as the value of the deferred gift became ascertainable.6 3 The
IRS attempted a similar solution through non-legislative means in
Revenue Ruling 81-31.64 There, an employer and employee entered
into a contract providing that, upon the employee's death, the em59 Since, at the time of the taxpayer's death, he would have had no interest under state
law in the assigned lease rights, they could not have been included in his gross estate. I.R.C.
§ 2033 (1976). See Macris, supra note 10, at 297.
60 Since the gift tax is only applicable to living donors, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(0, the
gift tax cannot apply to a transfer deemed to occur after the donor's death. See note 21 supra
and accompanying text. But see Macris, supra note 10, at 299 n.90 (suggesting that the sons
might be responsible for the gift tax as transferees under I.R.C. § 6901).
61 But see Macris, supra note 10, at 298-300.
62 Indeed, it has been argued that the absence of a mechanism in the Code for closing
deferred gifts dictates that the valuation-difficulty rule be rejected, even in the context of
contractual gifts. See Macris, supra note 10, at 302.
63 Perhaps, such an amendment should provide that in no event would the deferral continue beyond the donor's death. See note 89 inqfa and accompanying text.
64 1981-1 C.B. 475.
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ployer would pay an amount equal to twice the annual salary of the
employee at the time of his death to his surviving spouse. If the employee were no longer employed by his employer at the time of his
death or if the employee were not survived by a spouse, the employer
would not be required to make any payment.
The issue addressed by the IRS was whether, and if so, when,
the employee made a taxable gift of the death benefit to his spouse.
Ordinarily, an employee who enters into a death benefit agreement
with his employer designating a beneficiary without retaining any
right to modify the beneficiary's interest is deemed to have made a
taxable gift at the time the agreement is executed. 65 However, three
contingencies made valuation of the gift at the time the agreement
was executed difficult: (1) the amount of the death benefit was contingent upon the employee's annual salary at the time of his death;
(2) the payment would only be made if the employee were still employed by the employer at the time of his death; 66 and (3) the employee had to be married at the time of his death to qualify for the
payment. Applying the valuation-difficulty rule it had previously
adopted in Revenue Ruling 69-346,67 the IRS ruled that inasmuch as
the contingencies rendered the death benefit incapable of valuation
at the time the agreement was executed, the gift was not complete at
that time.68
65 In the estate tax context, it is settled that when an employee designates a beneficiary of
his death benefit, he has made a transfer within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2035, § 2036, § 2037,
or § 2038. Set, e.g., Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Estate of
Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Estate of Fried, 445 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.
1971); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Worthen v. United States, 192
F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961). The concept "transfer" as used in these estate tax provisions is
similar to its counterpart in the gift tax context. See Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-2 C.B. 323. But
see Rev. Rul. 80-289, 1980-2 C.B. 270 (revoking Rev. Rul. 79-231). Thus, just as the beneficiary designation of an employee death benefit constitutes a transfer for estate tax purposes, it
also constitutes a transfer for gift tax purposes. If, however, the employee retains the right to
alter the beneficiary, the gift is not complete until the right of alteration ceases. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1958).
66 It has been suggested that the employee's ability to eliminate the death benefit, i.e., to
revoke it, by terminating employment was sufficient dominion and control to negate the gift
and that, therefore, it was unnecessary for the IRS to reach the valuation-difficulty issue. See
SURREY, WARREN, MCDANIEL

&

GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAxATION 181

(2d ed. 1982). But compare Estate of Tully v. United States, 528 F.2d 1401 (Ct. Cl. 1976),
where the court held that the ability to alter a death benefit by terminating employment is
not a power within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2038. It follows that for gift tax purposes as well
such a power should be disregarded; that is, the retention of such a power should not be
deemed to negate the gift.
67 Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227. See text accompanying notes 9-12 rupra.
68 The IRS's issuance of Rev. Rul. 81-31 may have been motivated largely by the frequent failures it has sustained in the courts when seeking to require inclusion of death-benefit
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Although the IRS relied exclusively on Revenue Ruling 69-346
as support for its application of the valuation-difficulty rule, it must
be emphasized that, unlike Revenue Ruling 69-346, Revenue Ruling
81-31 involved a gift of a non-contractual nature.69 Thus, without
even discussing the issue or the distinction between the two rulings,
the IRS in Revenue Ruling 81-31 extended the valuation-difficulty
70
rule into the non-contractual setting.
What, then, does the IRS propose to do about the potential for
transfer tax avoidance inherent in applying the rule to non-contractual gifts? Such potential does not inhere in the employee benefit
plan of Revenue Ruling 81-31, says the IRS. The ruling's rationale
was that all of the contingencies had to be fulfilled by the time the
employee died. At that time, it would be known whether the employee would be married, whether he would still be employed by his
employer, and the amount of his annual salary. So, according to the
IRS, the value of the death benefit would become ascertainable and,
therefore, subject to gift tax at the time of the employee's death. If,
on the other hand, the employee were no longer employed by the
employer or were not married at his death, the employer would not
be required to make a payment. The employee would, therefore, not
have made a gift.
In these facts the IRS claims to have found the mechanism necessary to prevent transfer tax avoidance where the valuation-difficulty rule is applied to non-contractual gifts: the gift, viewed as
incomplete at the time the agreement is executed, becomes complete
and subject to gift tax at the time of the employee's death if the contingencies have been fulfilled; or if the contingencies have not been
fulfilled and the employer is therefore not required to make the payment, no transfer is deemed to occur.
In sum, the IRS has extended the valuation-difficulty rule to the
non-contractual gift of Revenue Ruling 81-31 on the implicit rationale that there was no potential for transfer tax avoidance. Consequently, according to the IRS, the valuation-difficulty rule is no
payments in the gross estate. See Esterces, Anatysis of Gif and Estate Tax Consequences ofDeath
Beneftts Under Non-qualifed Plans, 56J. TAx'N 100 (1982); Wolk, supra note 43, at 273.
69 Rev. Rul. 81-31 cannot be viewed as involving a contractual gift. The employee did
not make an agreement to make a transfer in the future; instead, once the agreement was
executed, he was required to make no further transfers, and he had no further obligations
concerning the death benefit plan.
70 The IRS had previously attempted to extend the valuation-difficulty rule to a noncontractual gift in Rev. Rul. 79-231, 1979-1 C.B. 323. There, also, potential for transfer tax
avoidance was lacking. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
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longer applicable solely to contractual gifts, but can also be used in a
non-contractual setting provided that the potential for transfer tax
avoidance is not present.
Under the present statute, can the IRS dichotomize non-contractual gifts, applying the valuation-difficulty rule only to those
non-contractual gifts that do not have potential for transfer tax
avoidance? As suggested previously, the Burnet v. Logan judicial gloss
can be superimposed upon the gift tax statute so that non-contractual gifts of a speculative value can be treated as incomplete until
their value becomes ascertainable. 7 1 The only impediment to giving
the gift tax statute this construction in the context of non-contractual
gifts is the potential for transfer tax avoidance, an impediment that is
sufficiently significant to warrant a rejection of the gloss. If, however,
application of the valuation-difficulty rule to a particular type of
non-contractual gift does not produce tax avoidance potential, then
there is no impediment to applying the rule to that gift. The statute,
therefore, can be applied on a bifurcated basis to non-contractual
gifts. 72 Indeed, it should be so applied since, as will be suggested
later,73 policy considerations dictate that the valuation-difficulty rule
be implemented in as many contexts as possible.
D. Is Revenue Ruling 81-31 Inconsistent with Regulations?
This bifurcated approach to non-contractual gifts required the
IRS to decide in Revenue Ruling 81-31 whether there was potential
for transfer tax avoidance. The IRS's implicit determination that
the facts in the ruling did not spawn such potential was presumably
premised on the theory that the gift could be valued at the employee's death and would, therefore, become subject to gift tax at
that time. 74 Unfortunately, the IRS did not address the ostensible
inconsistency of this theory with section 25.2511-2( of the regulations, 75 which provides, in part:
71 See notes 48-62 supra and accompanying text.
72 In effect, it is suggested here that the statute be given a trifurcated construction: contractual gifts, as well as non-contractual gifts that do not have the potential for tax avoidance,
are permissible candidates for the valuation-difficulty rule; on the other hand, non-contractual gifts that do have such potential should not be made subject to the rule unless the deathcompletion proposal (see notes 87-96 infra and accompanying text) is adopted.
73 See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
74 According to the IRS, if, at the time of the employee's death, the contingencies were
not fulfilled, the employer would not make any payment and no gift would be deemed to
occur.
75 But see G.C.M. 38273 (Feb. 7, 1980), where the IRS, in a somewhat conclusory fashion,
suggests that there is no inconsistency:
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The relinquishment or termination of a power to change the beneficiaries of transferred property, occurring otherwise than by the
death of the donor (the statute being confined to transfers by the iving
donors), is regarded
as the event which completes the gift and causes
76
the tax to apply.

The emphasized portion of the regulation, when read in conjunction with the language preceding it, suggests that where a gift
becomes complete by reason of the donor's death, the gift tax is not
77
applicable. If this is the meaning of the regulation and if it is valid,
then the view taken by the IRS in the ruling that the gift became
complete and subject to gift tax at the time of the employee's death
must be rejected.
When, however, the emphasized portion of paragraph (f) of the
regulation is examined in context, the apparent inconsistency of the
regulation and the ruling disappears. Paragraph (c) of the same section of the regulations provides that where a donor makes a gift while
reserving a power to either revoke or modify the interests of the beneficiaries, the gift is incomplete. Paragraph (f) then provides that a
donor who makes a gift with such a retained power is deemed to
complete the gift when the power is subsequently terminated. The
draftsman of paragraph (f) apparently foresaw that it should not apply where the power would terminate by virtue of the donor's death.
For if the paragraph were applicable to a termination arising at
death, donors making gifts with retained powers would be subject at
the time of death not merely to the gift tax but also to the estate
tax. 78 Obviously, to prevent the same transfer from being subjected
We acknowledge that the postponement of taxation until the decedent's final
quarter is subject to certain criticisms. Chief among these is that such postponement makes the transfer appear testamentary rather than intervivos. However, the
rationale for the result is that, prior to having a completed gift upon which the gift
tax is imposed, two requirements must be satisfied. There must be an irrevocable
transfer, and the property transferred must have an ascertainable value. In the
instant case, as discussed above, the transfer takes place when the decedent enters
into the employment contract. Therefore, it is the absence of ascertainable value,
not the absence of a transfer by a "living donor," Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(o, to
which the postponement of taxation is attributable.
76 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(0 (emphasis added). This regulation had been in effect in
substantially the same form for quite some time; indeed, the regulation derives from the 1932
Act. Congress' many reenactments of the gift tax without any adverse mention of this regulation, to be sure, gives it much vitality. See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933);
Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (Ist Cir. 1952).
77 Its validity would appear to be unquestionable. See note 76 supra.
78 I.R.C. § 2038 provides that where a decedent has made a transfer during life retaining
the power to revoke or to modify the interests of the beneficiaries, the subject of the gift is
includible in his gross estate. See also I.R.C. § 2036. Section 2038 will even require inclusion
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to both the estate tax and the gift tax, 79 the parenthetical "occurring
otherwise than by the death of the donor (the statute being confined
to transfers by living donors)" was included in paragraph (f), thus
negating the operation of the gift tax.80
This concern about the simultaneous imposition of the estate
where the decedent has merely retained the power to alter the timing of the beneficiary's
enjoyment. On the other hand, where a donor makes a transfer retaining such a power over
timing, he is, nevertheless, deemed to have made a complete gift. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d)
(1958).
79 In Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933), the Court indicated that by enacting
§ 501(c) of the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 154, 47 Stat. 169, 245 (1932), the regulation's antecedent, "Congress did not mean that the tax should be paid twice." 288 U.S. at
285. That is, the Supreme Court perceived the congressional scheme as imposing a gift tax or
an estate tax (but never both) on an interest transferred subject to the donor's retained power.
The substance of the Burnet v. Guggenheim analysis was embodied in the regulations, and
Congress, of the view that no statute was needed because the conclusions of the court in
Burnet v. Guggenheim had become firmly entrenched in gift tax theory, repealed § 501(c) in
1934. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 3d Sess.
50 (1934). Ste also Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999 (1st Cir. 1952). In Estate of Sanford
v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939), it was the double taxation potential that motivated the
adoption of the rule that where a donor transfers an item subject to a reserved power and
retains the power until his death, the item is includible in the donor's gross estate but not
subject to gift tax. Retreating from this approach, the Court, in Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318
U.S. 176 (1943), held that property transferred in trust could be subject to gift tax at the time
of the trust's creation and, nevertheless, subject to estate tax under § 2037s predecessor at the
time of death. Double taxation, the Court concluded, would be avoided by providing a credit
for the gift tax against the estate tax under § 2012's predecessor, thus giving the credit provision a more expansive reading than the Sanford Court was prepared to give it.
Under current law, by virtue of Smith v. Shaughnessy, it is possible that an item subject
to estate tax under § 2037 may have been previously subject to gift tax. Double taxation is
avoided by removing the gift from the category of adjusted taxable gifts and providing a
credit against the estate tax for the gift tax payable. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1976). On the other
hand, by virtue of Sanford, an item subject to estate tax under I.R.C. § 2036 because of a
retained power to revoke or change beneficiaries is not subject to gift tax. See Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2 (1958).
Even if, however, the rule in the regulation were removed and the termination of the
power at death were, therefore, made subject to both the estate tax and the gift tax, double
taxation would not result under the present statute. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 2001(b), the gift
would not constitute an adjusted taxable gift, and any gift tax paid would be credited against
the estate tax. So, while the rule was adopted to prevent double taxation, it serves no practical purpose under the current statute.
80 By establishing that the gift tax does not apply to the termination of a power at death,
the regulation does not precipitate a loss in revenue for the government. In fact, the estate
tax that was generated by virtue of subjecting the transfer to taxation under I.R.C. § 2038s
predecessor was greater than the foregone gift tax, since the estate tax rates were higher than
the gift tax rates. Of course, the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat.
1520, 1846 (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Tax Reform Act of 1976], equalized the estate and
gift tax rates. Moreover, although the scope of the provision authorizing a credit for gift taxes
paid against the estate tax was not clear, Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 29
(1939), any gift tax that would have been payable had the parenthetical not been inserted in
paragraph () would, presumably, have been creditable against the estate tax.
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and gift taxes, which prompted the inclusion of the parenthetical in
paragraph (f), should have no bearing on the IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 81-31 that the gift became complete at the time of the
employee's death. In the ruling, the IRS was confronted with two
alternatives: (1) to apply the gift tax at the time the employee entered into the agreement with his employer, even though the value of
the death benefit was not susceptible to calcUlation at that time; or
(2) to apply the gift tax at some subsequent time when valuation
would become possible. Choosing the latter alternative, the IRS imposed the gift tax at the time of the employee's death, when the benefit became susceptible to valuation. Given its choice, the IRS had to
apply the gift tax at the time of death, lest transfer tax avoidance
result.
.So, when the valuation-difficulty rule is applied, as in the ruling,
the imposition of the gift tax at death prevents tax avoidance. In
contrast, when the termination of a power is at issue, the imposition
of the gift tax at death would produce double taxation. 8 ' It is sound
policy, therefore, to reject, as the regulation does, the imposition of
the gift tax at death in the context of the termination of a power,
while accepting it, as the ruling does, in the context of a gift subject
to the valuation-difficulty rule.
Is it possible that, despite this logic, the draftsman of the parenthetical intended to apply it not merely to the termination of a power
but also to gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule? Inasmuch as
neither the Code nor the regulations provide for a valuation-difficulty rule and inasmuch as the IRS did not even mention such a rule
until 1969,82 it must be concluded that it was not contemplated when
the parenthetical's antecedent was drafted (in 1932)83 that a valuation-difficulty rule would subsequently evolve and that the parenthetical would affect it. Thus it is likely that the parenthetical was
designed to serve only one function: prevent double taxation where a
power is terminated by reason of the donor's death. It should not be
81 But see note 79 sufira.
82 See Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 C.B. 227.
83 The parenthetical first appeared as § 501(c) in the Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No.
154, 47 Stat. 169, 245 (1932). See note 79 supra. In Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280
(1933), the Court indicated that the 1932 legislation was, in substance, the same as sections
319 and 320 in the earlier 1924 gift tax statute. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, 43
Stat. 253, 313 (1924). In 1934, Congress repealed § 501(c) of the 1932 Act on the rationale
that its substance was made implicit in the gift tax statute by Burnet v. Guggenheim. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, 48 Stat. 680, 758 (1934).
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extended, beyond its intended function, to create transfer tax avoidance in the context of a gift subject to the valuation-difficulty rule.
Even though it is clear that the parenthetical, when analyzed
from a policy and historical viewpoint, should not have been applied
in Revenue Ruling 81-31,84 the phrase "the statute being confined to

transfers by living donors" does suggest that the employee's death
was not an appropriate event upon which to impose the gift tax. If
the phrase does create any doubt, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of limiting its application to the termination of powers. For
extending the phrase to the facts in the ruling would result in either a
rejection of the valuation-difficulty rule-i.e., apply the gift tax at
the time the death-benefit agreement is executed even though its
value is impossible to calculate-or transfer tax avoidance. The latter alternative being unacceptable and the valuation-difficulty rule
being attractive as a matter of policy,8 5 the decision seems easy: construe the phrase as applicable only to power terminations.
IV.

Death-Completion Rule: A Proposal

The valuation-difficulty rule provides a more accurate measurement of the value of a gift and should therefore be applied in as
many contexts as possible when the gift is difficult to value.8 6 One
constraint, however, that prevents expansive application of the rule is
that when it is applied to some gifts, tax avoidance can result.8 7 This
tax avoidance can be eliminated if a provision is adopted requiring
all gifts subject to the rule to become complete no later than the
death of the donor, thereby preventing any gift subject to the rule
from escaping the donor's transfer tax base. 88 Thus, the adoption of
such a rule would permit the valuation-difficulty rule to be applied
to any difficult-to-value gift without any concern about tax
avoidance.
What kind of rule would accomplish these objectives? First, of
course, the principle that gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule
become complete when valuation first becomes possible would be
84

But see Wolk, supra note 43, at 274-75.

85 See notes 104-06 infra and accompanying text.
86 See text accompanying notes 104-06 infia.
87 See notes 16-27 supra and accompanying text.
88 Contrast this death-completion rule proposed in text with the IRS's conclusion in Rev.
Rul. 81-31 that the employee's gift became complete at the time of his death. In the ruling,
value would necessarily become ascertainable at the time of death. See note 94 infla. If the
rule proposed in text were adopted, it would view difficult-to-value gifts as completed at the
time of the donor's death, even if value were still unascertainable at that time.
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continued. Second, all gifts subject to the rule that have not become
susceptible to valuation by the death of the donor would be deemed
complete at the time of the donor's death.8 9 Thus, all gifts subject to
the rule would eventually enter the donor's tax base. 90
If, at the time of the donor's death, the gift were still not capable
of valuation, a speculative approximation of value would be necessary. This need to speculate, however, is not produced by the valuation-difficulty rule or the rule requiring that the gift be deemed
complete by the donor's death, but rather by the notion that events
occurring after'the transferor's death should not affect the transfer
tax base.91 Indeed, the testamentary transfer of difficult-to-value
items requires the same speculative approximation for estate tax pur89 Since a principal purpose of the gift tax is to prevent avoidance of the estate tax,
Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939); Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d
234 (7th Cir. 1978), the gift tax statute should not be construed so as to bring within its scope
events, such as those occurring after death, that would be excluded from the estate tax base
were the gift instead testamentary. Thus, gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule should
be viewed as becoming complete no later than the date of the donor's death.
90 Cf. McDonald, Capital Gains and Losses in Canada, 29 CANADIAN B. REv. 908 (1951).
The Canadian capital gains tax is imposed at the time of death on the appreciation that has
occurred during the decedent's lifetime. The Canadian approach was rejected by Congress in
1976 when it opted instead for a carryover basis concept. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). See I.R.C. § 1023 (1978), which was repealed in
1980 by The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94
Stat. 229 (1980).
91 Generally, events occurring after death do not affect the estate tax base, on the theory
that the estate tax ought to be immediately calculable so that a prompt distribution of the
estate can be made. See Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Macris, supra
note 10, at 298; Note, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent to
Date ofDeath, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 654, 680 (1975); Comment, Efect of Events Subsequent to the
Decedent'sDeath on the Valuation of ClaimsAgainst His Estate Under Section 2053 of the FederalEstate
Ta, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 770, 781-82. Consequently, when a difficult-to-value item is owned at
the time of death, the value of the item as it can best be determined is included in the gross
estate, with post-death events that may reveal the true value as of the date of death being
disregarded. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Estate of Curry v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 540, 551 (1980); Estate of Cardeza v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 202 (1945), afd, 173 F.2d
(3d Cir. 1949); Estate of Houston v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1982); Rev. Rul.
67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324.
The principal exception to this rule excluding post-death events from the estate tax base
concerns the deduction for claims against the estate authorized by I.R.C. § 2053. In the
§ 2053 context, the courts have held that at least in some circumstances it is appropriate to
consider the post-death disposition of the claim, disallowing a deduction in those cases where
the creditor fails to properly assert his claim. See, e.g., Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 728 (1982); Estate of Cortney v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 317 (1974); Estate of Hagmann v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 465 (1973), affd, 492 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1974). See genrall
Note, Estate and Income Tax: Claims Against the Estate and Events Subsequent to Date ofDeath, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 654 (1975). But see Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1982). Taking into account post-death events in determining the deductibility of claims does
not, however, significantly disturb the policy objective of prompt estate administration, for
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poses. 92 So, unless the notion that post-death events be disregarded
for transfer tax purposes is abrogated, speculative approximation will
be necessary for those gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule
that do not become capable of valuation by the time of the donor's
death.
The combined application of the valuation-difficulty rule and
the rule that requires completion of the gift at the time of death creates a time period after the gift is initially made during which an
accurate measurement of value may be accomplished. This time period ends, however, at the time of the donor's death. If valuation
becomes possible during this time period, an accurate measurement
of value is obtained. If, on the other hand, valuation does not become possible by the time of the donor's death, the rough approximation that would have been made earlier is made instead at the time of
death. Thus, the approach suggested here provides possibly a more
the disposition of claims usually occurs shortly after death and in most, if not all cases, no
later than the time the fiduciary of the estate renders his final accounting.
There are other situations in which post-death events are similarly permitted to affect the
payment of estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 6166 and 2032A (where certain post-death dispositions
may trigger a greater or more immediate estate tax payment). But, with respect to both of
these sections, the largest amount of estate tax that can possibly become payable is immediately determinable. Also, the period during which a disposition may have an effect is limited
to 15 years. Thus, with few limited exceptions, the estate tax is computed without regard to
post-death events. But cf. I.R.C. § 691 (1976) (where income tax obligations arising out of
arrangements entered into by a decedent prior to death can be affected by post-death events,
such as a post-death failure by the person with whom the decedent contracted to make payments in accordance with the contract).
In the gift tax context, on the other hand, Congress has been more inclined to permit
post-transfer events to affect the tax base. Indeed, it is impossible to determine in most instances the amount of transfer tax attributable to an inter vivos gift until the death of the
donor. For example, a taxpayer making a gift of $600,000 in 1987 would not be required to
pay any gift tax by virtue of the unified credit. I.R.C. § 2505 (1976). Yet, if, at the donor's
death, he were to have sufficient assets to create a taxable estate, a transfer tax would be
imposed on the $600,000 gift made earlier. Thus, the exact amount of transfer tax attributable to an inter vivos gift cannot be calculated until the donor's taxable estate is determined, a
determination that obviously must await the donor's death. See also I.R.C. § 2602 (1976)
(which makes generation-skipping tax a function, to some extent, of prior inter vivos gifts).
Since the policy objective that dictates disregard of post-transfer events in the estate tax
context-prompt estate administration-is not operative in the gift tax context, post-severance events should be permitted to affect the gift tax calculation when the gift is initially
difficult to value and including the post-severance event in the valuation process will increase
accuracy in measuring the transfer. But so long as post-death events are excluded from the
estate tax base, such events should similarly be excluded from the gift tax base. Thus, all gifts
subject to the valuation-difficulty rule should be deemed complete no later than the donor's
death. See note 89 supra.
92 Estate of Cardeza v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 202 (1945), afd, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir.
1949); Rev. Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324. See also Wolk, The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate and
Gift Tax Anomaly, 66 MINN. L. REv. 229, 280 n.250 (1982).
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accurate measurement of value or, at worst, the rough approximation that would have had to have been made in any event.
Does administrative inconvenience create any insurmountable
obstacles to this approach? The most nettlesome aspect of the valuation-difficulty rule is its requirement that the gift be considered complete when the value of the gift can first be ascertained. In many
instances, it would be impossible for a taxpayer to determine with
certainty the year in which value first becomes ascertainable. If,
however, interest is made to accrue on the gift tax deficiency com93
mencing with the year in which value first becomes ascertainable,
no advantage will be enjoyed by taxpayers who fail to report their
gifts as soon as they can ascertain value. 94 In addition, taxpayers can
be deterred from playing the "audit lottery" by imposing a greater
interest rate where the taxpayer is found to lack a reasonable ground
95
for the reporting position he takes.
The second concern about the valuation-difficulty rule is the potential it creates for a gift subject to the rule to fall through the tax
93 For a suggestion that an interest charge be imposed even prior to the time when value
becomes ascertainable, see text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
94 On those occasions when the valuation-difficulty rule was applied, the date on which
the value of the gift became ascertainable and, hence, the date on which the gift was deemed
to become complete could not be disputed. See, e.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey,
101 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939) (where the gift was deemed to become complete when cash was
actually transferred by the donor); Rev. Rul. 81-31, 1981-1 C.B. 475 (where the value of the
death benefit became ascertainable at the time of the employee's death); Rev. Rul. 75-71,
1975-1 C.B. 309 (where the value of a gift of the right to receive a bequest became quantifiable at the time of the testator's death); Rev. Rul. 69-36, 1969-1 C.B. 227 (where the nature
of the donor's transfer to a trust created under her husband's will became calculable at the
time of the husband's death).
In each of these instances, the happening of a specific event triggered the transfer of
property to the donee, making it possible to calculate value. If, however, the valuation-difficulty rule is extended, as suggested in text, to situations where the donor makes an outright
transfer of a difficult-to-value item and no further transfer of property will be made to the
donee, the only event that can be viewed as completing the gift is value becoming ascertainable-there being no subsequent transfer of property to act as a triggering event. Determining exactly when value becomes ascertainable can, of course, be problematic. Perhaps this
problem warrants a rejection of the valuation-difficulty rule when the donor makes an outright transfer and does not have an obligation to make any further transfers.
As suggested in the text, however, the problem is adequately addressed by imposing an
interest charge on donors who fail to file a return and pay the gift tax in the year in which
value becomes ascertainable. Of course, some administrative inconvenience does inhere in an
interest charge of this nature since the IRS and the courts will be required to determine the
year in which value becomes ascertainable. Weighing this administrative inconvenience
against the alternative of not applying the valuation-difficulty rule to outright gifts, the author is of the view that the increased accuracy in measuring transfers afforded by the valuation-difficulty rule makes its application desirable.
95 Cf. I.R.C. § 6653 (1976) (providing in effect an increased interest rate for deficiencies
attributable to negligence).
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collector's net, resulting from the IRS's inability to detect a gift when
it is not reported at the time initially made because not complete
under the rule. To prevent this, taxpayers should be required to file
a gift tax return at the time the gift is made, even though the valuation-difficulty rule is applicable. 9 6 When the value of the gift subsequently becomes ascertainable, an additional return would be filed,
and the tax would be paid. If the taxpayer fails to file the second
return either because value does not become ascertainable prior to
the donor's death or because the taxpayer chooses not to file, the IRS
would presumably make inquiry about the missing return in connection with the audit of the estate tax return.
In sum, adoption of this death-completion proposal will make
possible an expansive application of the valuation-difficulty rule
without permitting tax avoidance. Since application of the valuation-difficulty rule increases valuation accuracy, the rule should be
expansively applied, complemented by the death-completion rule to
prevent tax avoidance.
V.
A.

Valuation

Selecting the Valuation Time Frame

In Revenue Ruling 81-31, the IRS used the valuation-difficulty
rule to determine that the gift of death benefits became complete at
the employee's death. The IRS then turned its attention to the valuation question: what was the amount of the taxable gift? The IRS
had little difficulty with this question, concluding that the amount of
the gift was the value, at the time of death, of the benefit payable to
the employee's spouse. According to the IRS, when a gift is made
subject to the valuation-difficulty rule, the amount of the gift is equal
to its value at the time the gift becomes complete, when value becomes ascertainable.

97

Neither the Code nor the regulations explicitly indicate the date
on which a gift subject to the valuation-difficulty rule is to be valued.
Section 2512, the only provision in the Code that addresses gift tax
valuation, states that "if the gift is made in property, the value
thereof at the date of the gift shall be considered the amount of the
96 Cf I.R.C. § 1034 (1976) (requiring taxpayers who sell their residence to report the sale
on their income tax return even though they intend to secure nonrecognition by purchasing a
new residence).
97 The IRS first suggested this position, albeit somewhat subtly, in Rev. Rul. 69-346,
1969-1 C.B. 227. Then in Rev. Rul. 75-71, 1975-1 C.B. 309, the IRS applied the rule that it
had merely hinted at in Rev. Rul. 69-346.
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gift." But is "the date of the gift" the date enforceable rights are
created in the donee under the state law or the date those rights subsequently became capable of valuation? Thus far, the courts' answer
has unanimously been the same as the IRS's-that the amount of a
gift subject to the valuation-difficulty rule is its value on the date it
becomes capable of valuation. 98
I Support can be found for this position in section 2501 of the
Code. This section provides, in part, that the gift tax is "imposed for
each calendar year on the transfer of property during such calendar
year by any individual." 99 Thus, if a gift is rendered incomplete by
applying the valuation-difficulty rule, no "transfer of property"
within the meaning of section 2501 is deemed to occur until valuation can be ascertained. When valuation subsequently becomes possible, the "transfer of property" occurs, triggering the gift tax. So,
the date of a gift subject to the valuation-difficulty rule for section
2501 purposes is the date on which valuation can be accomplished.
Is it not likely that Congress intended that the "date of the gift"
as the phrase is used in the valuation section 2512, would have the
98 See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hoey, 101 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that the
actual payments made in discharge of an obligation previously imposed upon the taxpayer by
a court were subject to the gift tax); Estate of Bressani v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 373 (1966)
(indicating in dicta that a wife who had agreed with her husband to make a gift at the time of
her husband's death made a gift equal to the value on the date of his death of the property
she was required to transfer); see Macris, supra note 10, at 301 (suggesting that partly because
I.R.C. § 2512 requires valuation as of the date the gift becomes subject to valuation, the
valuation-difficulty rule should be rejected). Cf Robinson v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d 774
(5th Cir. 1982) (the court suggested that the amount of the gift is its value on the date it
becomes complete and the events occuring before completion are not relevant to the valuation process).
In Robinson, the taxpayer's husband died, leaving a will that required the taxpayer to
transfer her property to a trust as a condition to her receiving the benefits provided for her in
his will. The taxpayer fulfilled the condition imposed upon her in the will by transferring her
property to the trust. The terms of the trust enabled the taxpayer to alter the interests of the
remaindermen. Consequently, her transfer of property to the trust did not effect a gift of the
remainder. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2. Four years later, the taxpayer relinquished her power
over the remainder. At that time, her gift became complete. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(). The
question presented was whether the amount of her gift could be reduced by the value of the
benefits she had received under the will four years earlier. The court held that the gift tax is
imposed on the value of the gift when the gift was made, and the events occurring after the
gift was made but before the gift's completion do not affect the amount of the gift.
It should be noted that none of the authorities cited in this footnote, other than the
Macris article, squarely considered the appropriate valuation mechanism for gifts subject to
the valuation-difficulty rule. In Estate of Bressani, the court was not required to, and indeed
did not, analyze the amount of the taxable gift. In Hog, the gift was of cash, not property,
and the court did not discuss the appropriate date on which to value a gift subject to the rule.
And, of course, Robinson did not involve the valuation-difficulty rule at all.
99 I.R.C. § 2501 (1976).
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same meaning as the date on which a "transfer of property" is
deemed to occur within the meaning of section 2501? To be sure,
Congress did contemplate that the section 2501 time-frame and the
section 2512 time-frame would be the same, so that the amount of a
gift would always equal its value on the date it became subject to the
gift tax. 10 0 But, while contemplating the relationship of these two
sections, Congress gave no thought to applying them to a gift subject
to the valuation-difficulty rule. Perhaps, therefore, the time-frame
connection of sections 2501 and 2512 need not be applied to gifts
subject to the rule. That is, such gifts, while becoming subject to the
gift tax when valuation is feasible, could possibly be valued as of the
earlier date on which enforceable rights were created in the donee.' 0
Whether gifts subject to the rule should be split for completion and
valuation purposes or treated like all other gifts-valuation and completion occurring simultaneously-is a question that can only be resolved by examining the underlying policy of the gift tax, 10 2 since
03
Congress failed to incorporate an explicit resolution in the statute.
By hypothesis, the valuation-difficulty rule is only applied to
those gifts that are not immediately capable of valuation. If the rule
were not utilized, how would the value of the transfer be measured?
Presumably, a rough approximation of value would be made; 10 4 and,
of course, in some cases, a rough approximation would not even be
possible, resulting in a tax-free transfer of wealth. 10 5
On the other hand, if the rule is utilized, the value of the transfer is accurately measured, and no wealth transfer escapes the transfer tax because of difficulties in valuation. The rule, therefore, is a
100 See Robinson v. Commissioner, 675 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1982); Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1946); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1.
101 But see Macris, supra note 101, at 301, 302. On the other hand, one could certainly
argue that I.R.C. §§ 2501 and 2512 are clear on their face and that the unified time frame
that they create for valuation and completion purposes should be applied to all gifts, even
those subject to the valuation-difficulty rule.
102 See text accompanying notes 108-09 infla.
103 On the other hand, one could certainly argue that I.R.C. §§ 2501 and 2512 are clear
on their face and that the unified time-frame that they create for valuation and completion
purposes should be applied to all gifts, even those subject to the valuation-difficulty rule.
104 See Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954),cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955),
where the court did not utilize the rule, though value was speculative and difficult to calculate. There was, however, unrefuted expert testimony in the record that did establish a value.
See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
105 Where a value is selected for transfer tax purposes at a time when difficult or impossible to value contingencies are present, the transfer can be assigned a nominal value. See
Estate of Cardeza v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 202 (1945), afd, 173 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1949); Rev.
Rul. 67-370, 1967-2 C.B. 324. If the value of the transferred item ultimately proves to be in
excess of nominal value, this excess escapes the transferor's tax base.
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salutory one and should, as a matter of policy, be applied to any gift
10 6
producing valuation uncertainty.
The principal problem created by the rule concerns the selection
of the correct time-frame for the computation of value. If sections
2501 and 2512 are construed as effecting a unified time-frame for
both valuation and gift completion purposes, then the amount of a
gift subject to the rule will be its value on the date valuation becomes
possible. This construction would require all events occurring after
the donor had severed control over the gift but prior to valuation
becoming possible to enter the valuation calculus. This result, however, violates the inveterate transfer tax precept that all events occurring after the donor has severed control over the given item should
07
not affect the computation of the gift's value.
106 Some have suggested, however, that the rule should either be restricted or rejected
because of insurmountable problems inherent in it. STEPHENS, sufira note 19, at 10-23; Macris, sufira note 10, at 300-03.
107 Unless a gift is subject to the valuation-difficulty rule, a gift is complete and its value
at that time is subject to tax. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2. See STEPHENS, sufira note 19, at 10-24
to 10-29; Macris, supra note 10, at 292. If, on the other hand, the donor makes a gift but
retains control over the transferred item-the ability to change the interests of the beneficiaries, to revoke the transfer, or to alter the timing of the beneficiaries' enjoyment-then all
events occurring after the initial transfer is made up until the donor dies, or the retained
control terminates, are included in the valuation process. I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038 (1976).
Thus, as a general matter, valuation for transfer tax purposes does not take into account any
events occurring after the donor relinquishes control.
An exception to this general rule was contained in I.R.C. § 2035. Prior to the enactment
of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981], § 2035 provided that a transfer made
within three years of death would be included in the gross estate, the amount included being
the value of the transferred item at the time of the donor's death. Thus, a donor could transfer an item, completely severing his control over it, and if he died within three years of the
transfer, its value at the time of his death would be subject to tax-even though the item
might have substantially increased in value between the time of transfer and death. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 72-282, 1972-1 C.B. 306.
Realizing that this result was inconsistent with general transfer tax theory, Congress, in
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, amended § 2035 to provide that "post-gift appreciation will not be subject to transfer taxes." S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, reprinted
in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 228. The substance of the amendment is that
§ 2035(a) will no longer require that items transferred within three years of death be included
in the gross estate; instead, the value of the transferred item at the time it is initially transferred is made subject to the gift tax, and that same value concomitantly becomes an adjusted
taxable gift, thereby affecting the donor's estate tax calculation. Hence, § 2035 is now compatible with the transfer tax principle that post-transfer events do not affect the valuation
process.

Curiously, Congress did not bring § 2035 into full compliance with general transfer tax
theory. Instead, it provided that if a donor retains a power or interest under §§ 2036, 2037,
2038, 2041, or 2042, or transfers or relinquishes the power or interest within three years of
death, the value of the transferred item at the time of the donor's death is included in the
gross estate. To illustrate, assume a donor transfers an item in trust but retains the power to
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This violation of transfer tax theory is produced by a clash of
three principles: 1) the valuation-difficulty rule; 2) the notion that
events occurring after the donor has severed control (post-transfer
events) should have no bearing on the valuation process; and 3) the
construction of sections 2501 and 2512 as creating a unified timeframe.
To resolve this clash, a comparison of the policies underlying
each of these three principles is necessary. As suggested, the valuation-difficulty rule is beneficial, since it permits the accurate measurement of transfers that are inherently difficult to value when
initially made. Omitting post-transfer events from the valuation process also serves an important function: donors can compute their gift
tax liability at the time that they sever their control over the gift.108
In contrast, applying the third principle, the unified-time-frame construction, to all gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule without
any limitation does not fulfill any policy objective; 0 9 indeed, as sugrevoke the trust. Shortly after creating the trust, the donor relinquishes his power to revoke,
at which time the value of the transferred item is $100. If the donor dies within three years of
relinquishing his power, the value of the transferred item at the time of death is included in
his gross estate, even if the value at the time of death has increased to $1,000,000. There is no
policy justification for including in the transfer tax base all of the appreciation that occurs
after the donor severs his control, when he relinquishes the power of revocation. Indeed, if the
donor had instead made an outright transfer of the item when it had a value of $100, the
appreciation would not have been subject to transfer tax, even if the decedent had died
within three years of making the transfer. It must be conceded, however, that it may be
administratively convenient to tax life insurance, as the amendment provides, on the value at
death where an insured dies within three years of transferring his policy, because of the difficulties involved in establishing a value for a policy on the date of its transfer, particularly
where the insured is seriously ill on that date.
108 Consider, for example, the donor who decides to transfer property having a value of
$100 to his son. When informed that the gift tax will be, say, $20, the donor decides to make
the transfer, indicating that if the tax were any greater, he would not make the transfer.
Should the fact that the gift doubles in value the day following the date of the gift increase
the donor's gift tax liability? If this were possible, the donor would be required to pay the
increased gift tax even though he would have no right under state law to revoke the gift and
enjoy the benefit of the appreciation. Obviously, the inclusion of post-transfer events in the
valuation process would make gift tax liability unpredictable, deterring many donors from
making gifts that they would otherwise want to make.
It should be noted, however, that under the present statute some post-transfer events,
though excluded from the valuation process, can affect the transfer tax liability attributable
to an inter vivos gift. When a gift is made, the gift tax liability is computed without regard to
the remaining estate of the donor. However, at the donor's death, that inter vivos gift becomes
subject to estate tax at the estate tax marginal bracket. Thus, as the donor's remaining estate
increases after the inter vivos gift has been made, the concomitant increase in the estate tax
marginal bracket will generate an increase in the transfer tax attributable to the gift. Still,
the amount of the gift added to the estate is not affected by post-transfer events. I.R.C.
§ 2001 (1976).
109 With respect to all other gifts, it is sound policy to apply a unified-time-frame con-
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gested previously, Congress never even contemplated that the statute
would be given such a construction in the context of gifts subject to
the rule. The valuation-difficulty rule can be used while excluding,
in many instances, post-transfer events from the valuation process, if
the unified time frame construction is not rigidly applied. Since a
rigid construction is not grounded in any policy objective, at least
insofar as gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule are concerned,
and since the valuation-difficulty rule and the rule excluding posttransfer events from the valuation process do serve important objectives, a flexible approach to the section 2501 and section 2512 time
frames is desirable. In other words, while as a general rule it is appropriate to calculate value as of the date the donor severs control
over the gift-excluding post-severance events--it is nevertheless appropriate, with respect to difficult-to-value gifts, to calculate value at
the time valuation becomes possible, taking into account post-severance events.
B.

Revelation v. Non-Revelation Events

Whenever the valuation-difficulty rule is applied, at least one
post-transfer event-the ultimate outcome of the contingency inherent in the gift that makes it necessary to apply the valuation-difficulty rule-must affect the valuation. That is not to say, however,
that all other post-transfer events must also be included in the valuation process. Indeed, it will be argued that the only post-transfer
events that should affect the valuation process are those that reveal
the outcome of the contingencies that made it appropriate to invoke
the valuation-difficulty rule in the first instance. Such post-transfer
events will be termed "revelation events."
The approach suggested here works an accomodation of two
conflicting policy objectives. On the one hand, transfer tax theory
generally requires that post-transfer events be disregarded. On the
other hand, when the valuation-difficulty rule is applied to permit
the accurate measurement of a transfer that is difficult to value at the
time it is initially made, it is obviously necessary to include in the
valuation process the post-transfer outcome of the difficult-to-value
struction, taxing the gift on its value at the time it becomes complete-i.e., when the donor
severs his control over the gift. Value at the time control is severed is certainly an appropriate
basis upon which to impose a transfer tax. On the other hand, if such a unified approach
were taken with respect to gifts subject to the rule, post-transfer events would be included in
the valuation process. So, while it is sound to apply a unified construction to gifts that are not
subject to the rule, there is no policy justification for applying such a construction to gifts that
are subject to the rule.
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contingency. So, the compromise is struck by eliminating all posttransfer events other than the revelation of the outcome of the difficult-to-value contingency from the valuation process.
To illustrate, assume a father owns an interest in an oil well that
he wishes to transfer to his daughter. Anxious to induce his daughter
to attend college, he enters into an agreement with her obligating
him to provide her with the income generated by the oil well for a
ten-year period if the daughter attends college. The daughter agrees
and in fact does enroll in a college program. 110 At the time the contract is executed, oil is selling for $30 per barrel. The value of the
father's gift to his daughter is not ascertainable at the time of contract execution because it is scientifically impossible to determine the
number of barrels of oil that the well will produce.
Five years after the contract is executed, the oil well produces
1,000 barrels, and it is determined that the well is incapable of producing any more oil. The 1,000 barrels are sold on behalf of the
daughter at the market price of $60 per barrel, the market price per
barrel having doubled since the contract between the father and
daughter was executed.
Were it not for the valuation difficulty-the inability to predict
at the time of contract execution the number of barrels of oil that
would be produced by the well-the father would be deemed to have
made a gift to his daughter at the time his obligation became enforceable under state law, when the daughter enrolled in the college
program." Applying the valuation-difficulty rule, the gift will be
deemed complete when it is ascertained that the well is capable of
12
producing only 1,000 barrels.'
What is the amount of this gift? To resolve this question, one
must first determine which post-transfer events should be permitted
to affect the valuation process. The discovery that the well can only
produce 1,000 barrels is, to be sure, a post-transfer event, since it occurs five years after the father severed his control by irrevocably committing himself to the gift. This event, however, merely reveals a fact
that was in existence but could not be determined at the time the
110 Assume that the father's obligation becomes enforceable under state law and irrevocable once the daughter enrolls in the college program. Cf Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344
(where the obligation did not become enforceable until the child graduated).
S11 A contractual gift is ordinarily deemed complete when the obligation to make it becomes enforceable under state law. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. The daughter's
enrollment in the college program is not deemed sufficient consideration to avoid the imposition of the gift tax. See Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344.
112 But see note 94 supra.
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contract was executed. Indeed, it was the inability to ascertain the
number of barrels of oil that the well would produce that made application of the valuation-difficulty rule appropriate. Since the purpose of the valuation-difficulty rule is to defer valuation until the
outcome of the difficult-to-value contingency reveals itself, the revelation that the well can only produce 1,000 barrels must be used to
value the gift.
The increase in the price per barrel of oil that occurred during
the five years after the father and daughter had executed the contract is a post-transfer event of a different kind. This occurrence does
not reveal any condition in existence at the time of contract execution. In fact, pricing a barrel of oil at that time did not create any
valuation difficulties. The price was $30. Adhering to the general
notion that post-transfer events ought to be excluded from valuation,
the price increase (a post-transfer event of a non-revelation character) should be disregarded in computing the amount of the gift.
Consequently, the amount of the gift should be $30,000 (1,000
barrels at the price of $30).113 It must be emphasized that two valua113 If the oil were not immediately available to the donee, determining the amount of the
gift would require a present-value analysis. The difficulty with this analysis is that, as time
elapses, the price of oil may well experience an inflationary increase in value. How does this
inflationary increase in value interact with the discount rate applied to compute present
value? In this context, the discount rate must serve two functions: offset the anticipated
inflation and reduce the value of the oil by the real cost of capital, which is the rate of return
an investor could earn in a non-inflationary marketplace. Se DOCA v. Marina Mercante
Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980).
To illustrate, assume an anticipated inflation rate of 7% and that an investor could earn
3% if the market were non-inflationary. Given these expectations about inflation and the real
rate of return on capital, a prudent investor would seek a return of 10% during the course of a
year. Of course, only 3% will represent a true economic return, i.e., the real rate of return on
capital, for the remaining 7% of profit merely keeps the investor even with inflation. If the
investor were to buy one unit of oil, when oil is selling for $1 per unit, to be delivered one year
from the date of purchase, what amount would he pay-or, in other words, what would be
the present value of the right to receive one unit of oil one year hence? When the investor
receives the unit of oil, its value will be $1.07, assuming its value increases in accordance with
the 7% inflation rate. The value in today's dollars of the right to receive $1.07 in one year
would be 97.47 cents (1.07 divided by 1.10). Thus, the 10% discount rate utilized accomplished its dual purpose: it offset the inflation and reduced the 1.07 value by an amount
necessary to reflect the real rate of return on capital that a prudent investor would seek on an
investment of 97.47 cents.
The present-value tables contained in the regulations (Tres. Reg. § 25.2512-9 (1958)),
however, take a different approach to the inflation question-they simply ignore it. For example, assume that the corpus of a trust consists of one unit of oil, having a current value of
$1. If the table (premised on a 6% discount rate) were utilized in valuing the remainder
interest in this trust, which is to become possessory in one year, its present value would be 94.3
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tion time frames have been used in reaching this conclusion.1 1 4 With
respect to price, value is computed as of the date the father irrevocacents (1.00 divided by 1.06). The calculation is made by applying the 6% discount to the
value in today's dollars of the corpus without taking into account the potential for inflation.
This failure to include inflation in the calculus results in an undervaluation of the remainder interest. This undervaluation is offset to some extent, however by the use of a 6%
discount rate, a rate that is certainly low in our assumed economy anticipating 7% inflation
and providing a real rate of return of 3%. Since a 10% discount rate, which would be more
appropriate in our assumed economy, produces a present value of 97.27 cents (1.07 divided by
1.10) when inflation is taken into account-contrast this with the present value of 94.3 when
inflation is disregarded and a 6% discount rate is applied--the undervaluation attributable to
disregarding inflation is not fully offset by the use of an artificially low discount rate of 6%.
Thus, a discount rate of less than 6% would have to be utilized in order to fully offset the
undervaluation attributable to the disregard of inflation.
That is not to suggest, however, that the 6% discount rate incorporated in the tables
should be reduced. Indeed, the 6% rate, when applied in other situations, could be low in the
context of our assumed economy. To illustrate, assume a trust having a corpus of $1, which is
invested in a note payable in one year. The value of the remainder interest in this trust, to
become possessory in one year, should not be greater than 90.9 cents (1.00 divided by 1.10),
for a prudent investor investing 90.9 cents would expect one year later to have 1.00 by virtue
of the 7% inflation rate and the 3% real return on capital-a borrower would certainly be
willing to pay the invester interest of 10%, given the assumed economic conditions. Yet the
tables, by applying a 6% discount rate, would produce a present value for this remainder of
94.3 cents (1.00 divided by 1.06). Thus, in the context of this hypothetical, the 6% discount
rate is too low-the higher, more appropriate rate of 10% would produce a lower (and, given
the economic conditions, a more accurate) present value of 90.9 cents.
In sum, the discount rate of 6% is too high where the remaindermen will enjoy the benefits of inflation, such as in the hypothetical where the trust corpus consists of a unit of oil,
while the rate is too low if the corpus is held in investments that are not sensitive to inflation,
such as a note. The tables are designed to apply to all types of investments (see Rev. Rul. 77195, 1977-1 C.B. 295) without regard to whether the remainderman is entitled to enjoy the
benefits of inflation-indeed without regard to inflation at all. The tables' use of a 6% rate
may well effect a reasonable compromise in light of this failure to distinguish between the
inflation-and-noninflation sensitive remainder.
114 In the estate tax context, a two-time-frame approach to valuation similar to the one
suggested in the text has been utilized. In Commissioner v. Shively's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d
Cir. 1960), a decedent had obligated himself to make payments to his surviving spouse for her
life or untif she remarried. Before the decedent's executor was required to file the estate tax
return, the spouse remarried. The court held that the I.R.C. § 2053 deduction for the
spouse's claim against the estate could not exceed the amount actually paid to her by the
estate prior to her remarriage. In other words, while all other items were valued as of the date
of the decedent's death, the court took into account a post-death factor, the spouse's remarriage, in determining the amount of the § 2053 deduction.
In Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 394 (1961), af'd, 320 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.
1963), the court similarly took into account a post-death factor in the context of a § 2053
deduction. There, at the time of decedent's death, a contingent claim was outstanding that
her estate might ultimately be required to discharge. The court held that the § 2053 deduction should be equal to the amount that the estate was actually held responsible for in the
litigation. Thus, the outcome of the litigation, a post-death factor, was taken into account in
computing the taxable estate. See a/ro Estate of Moor v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH)
1530 (1982), where the court said: "Thus, subsequent events are irrelevant except insofar as
they cast light on the facts and circumstances which were in existence or to be anticipated as
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bly committed himself to the gift. On the other hand, the quantity
factor is measured as of five years later, when it is first ascertained.
Would the amount of the father's gift have been different had
the quantity factor been ascertainable at the time the contract became enforceable? Not at all. The product of the $30 price and the
1,000 barrel quantity would, of course, have been the amount of the
gift, the same computation suggested when the gift could not be valued initially. Thus, if one uses two time frames (taking into account
the revelation event and disregarding the non-revelation event) to
value the gift where quantity is not ascertainable at the outset, the
conclusion reached is the same as that reached for the gift where
quantity is immediately ascertainable. This parity is sensible. Indeed, it would be inequitable to tax the two transfers differently
merely because, in one case, the quantity could not be ascertained at
the time the contract between father and daughter became enforceable. In short, the price per barrel used in computing value should be
the same whether or not quantity is immediately ascertainable.
C.

Neutralization of Deferral

Although the gift having a quantity that can be determined immediately and the gift with an unascertainable quantity superficially
appear to be entitled to equivalent treatment, there is a difference
between the two, warranting, perhaps, different treatment. The gift
whose value is calculable at the outset is immediately subject to tax,
while the other does not become subject to tax until its value becomes ascertainable. There is no policy rationale to support the
deferral of the tax obligation in one case while requiring an immediate payment of the tax in the other. To remove the deferral, an interest charge accruing from the date the father becomes legally
obligated to make the gift until the date the quantity becomes ascertainable should be imposed on the tax obligation. 1 5 If an interest
charge were imposed, the disparity between the two hypothesized
gifts would be neutralized.
Of course, the Code does not presently provide for an interest
charge. Consequently, gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule
will enjoy preferential treatment if all non-revelation events are disreof the date of death." Cf. Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. No. 728 (1982). See
note 91 supra and note 120 infra.
115 Congress has previously imposed an interest charge in order to remove the benefit of
tax deferral. See I.R.C. §§ 667, 668 (1976), added by section 1014 of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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garded in calculating value. Unless the Code is amended to provide
for an interest charge, this preferential treatment can only be ameliorated by including some post-transfer increases in value, although
non-revelation events, in the gift tax base. If the post-transfer increase in value approximates the inflation rate, the deferral will be
roughly neutralized (taking into account the relationship between
the inflation rate and the appropriate interest rate).116
That is not to say,'however, that all non-revelation events should
be indiscriminately permitted to affect the valuation process. Assume, for example, the same facts previously hypothesized about the
father who promises his daughter the income generated by his oil
well in return for her agreement to enroll in college. Although the
number of barrels of oil the well was capable of producing was not
scientifically ascertainable at the time of contract execution, assume
that it is determined one year later that the well can produce 1,000
barrels. The price of oil, which was $30 per barrel at the time of
contract execution, has increased in accordance with the 10% inflation rate experienced in the one-year period between the time the
father committed himself to the gift and the time the quantity of oil
to be produced by the well is ascertained. This $3-per-barrel increase
in value is not the only fortunate event to have occurred during the
116 Assume for example, that a gift having a value of $100 is made on January 1, 1982. If
the donor is in a 50% gift tax bracket, he is required to make a gift tax payment of $50. If,
because of some difficult-to-value contingency, the valuation-difficulty rule is applied to the
gift, the donor is not required to make any gift tax payment. Assuming that the value of the
gift becomes ascertainable on January 1, 1983, and that its value has increased by the inflation rate of, say, 10% to $100, the amount of the gift tax required to be paid would be $55
($110 taxed at 50%). Thus, by including the post-transfer increase in value, which is here
equal to the inflation rate, in the gift tax base, the taxpayer enjoys the deferral provided by
the valuation-difficulty rule at a cost of $5. This $5 cost is, in effect, the equivalent of a 10%
non-deductible interest charge on the $50 tax obligation paid one year late by virtue of the
valuation-difficulty rule. So, if the inflation rate approximates a fair interest rate (generally,
the inflation rate is a few percentage points less than the prevailing interest rate, see Current
Investment Questionsand the Prudent Person Rule, 13 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 650, 664
(1978)), and the post-transfer increase in value approximates the inflation rate, the inclusion
of the post-transfer increase in value in the tax base roughly neutralizes the deferral.
It should be noted that an increase in the donor's marginal gift tax bracket will increase
the cost of the deferral. For example, if, in the example posited in this note, the taxpayer had
been in a 60% marginal bracket with respect to the $10 post-transfer increase in value, the
cost of the deferral (i.e., the interest-charge equivalent) would have been $6 (the $10 increase
at the marginal rate of 60%). Thus, an increase in the marginal bracket may result in an
interest-charge equivalent that is greater than the inflation rate. This, however, is not an
unattractive prospect, for the inflation rate tends, generally, to be somewhat less than the
prevailing interest rate. Moreover, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has significantly
reduced the progressive aspect of the transfer tax rates, resulting, in fact, in a maximum
transfer tax bracket of 50%.
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one-year time period. Assume that, in addition, shortly after the father irrevocably obligated himself to this gift, a process was discovered whereby, at no cost, a barrel of oil could be converted into a
diamond with a value of $500.
Which post-transfer events should be included in the gift tax
base?. As previously suggested, the determination that the well can
produce 1,000 barrels is a post-transfer event of a revelation character and, therefore, must be taken into account. On the other hand,
the 10% increase in the price of oil and the discovery of the oil-diamond conversion process are non-revelation events and should, therefore, 'be excluded from the valuation process. However, if both nonrevelation events are excluded from the valuation process, the
amount of the gift is $30,000 (1,000 barrels at $30 per barrel), and
the taxpayer enjoys the benefit of an unwarranted deferral.
Without a code provision imposing an interest charge, there are
only two alternatives that can be used to neutralize the deferral:
Take into account in valuing the gift either the $3-per-barrel increase
in the price of oil or the discovery of the oil-diamond conversion process.1 17 If only the $3-per-barrel price increase is included in value,

the amount of the gift is $33,000 (1,000 barrels at $33 per barrel).
This is an equitable result, for it is equivalent to the result that would
occur if all non-revelation events were excluded from the valuation
process and a 10% interest charge were imposed to neutralize the
deferral. I"8 The other alternative, including the oil-diamond conversion process in the valuation calculus, does not merely neutralize the
deferral; instead, it converts what hindsight indicates was a $30,000
gift one year earlier into a $500,000 gift (1,000 diamonds which derive from the 1,000 barrels of oil, at a price of $500 each).
While the former alternative may be more equitable, its selec117 While, in the context of other facts, it might be appropriate to include all non-revelation events in the valuation process in order to neutralize the deferral, it would add little to
the analysis to do that here. For if the oil-diamond conversion discovery is included in the
valuation process, the increase in the price of oil becomes irrelevant. Indeed, it can hardly be
disputed that the value of the oil as of the date quantity becomes ascertainable is solely a
function of its worth as a substance capable of being converted to diamonds. In short, no
reasonable seller would be willing to sell a barrel of oil for $33 when he could convert that
same barrel of oil, at no cost, into a diamond having a $500 value.
118 Since the price of oil increased by 10%-the inflation rate-including the price increase in the tax base should neutralize the deferral. See note 116 SUpra. It should be noted,
however, that when the inflation rate is substantially less than the prevailing interest rate,
including the price increase in the tax base will not fully neutralize the deferral. Although
the inflation rate is, generally, only a few percentage points less than prevailing interest rates,
recent economic conditions indicate that the inflation rate can, at least temporarily, deviate
significantly from interest rates.
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tion is difficult to rationalize on a principled basis. The only distinction between the two non-revelation events is that the inclusion of
the other has the effect of taxing what is, in essence, a $30,000 gift as
if it were a $500,000 gift. The decision whether to include a particular non-revelation event in value cannot rationally be made to turn
upon whether its inclusion will produce neutralization of the deferral. Indeed, it would be easy to posit hypotheticals where each of the
non-revelation events, when included in the tax base, would fail to
produce neutralization.'" 9 The preferable approach would be to
neutralize the deferral by imposing an interest charge, excluding all
non-revelation events from the tax base. Unless, however, this approach is embodied in the Code, an alternative to "picking and
choosing" the particular non-revelation event that will produce neutralization must be found.
D. Death-Benefit Plans and Revenue Ruling 81-31
Some types of gifts do have inherent in them non-revelation
events that intrinsically neutralize the deferral, perhaps creating a
rational basis for excluding all other non-revelation events from the
tax base. The employee death benefit in Revenue Ruling 81-31 is an
example of such a gift.
In the ruling, as will be recalled, the IRS applied the valuationdifficulty rule because the death benefit was explicitly made to depend upon three difficult-to-value contingencies: (1) the employee
was required to be employed at the time of his death; (2) the employee was required to be survived by a spouse; and (3) the amount
of the death benefit was twice the employee's annual salary at the
time of death. The IRS ruled that, at the time of the employee's
death, when the outcome of these contingencies would be revealed, a
gift in the amount of the death benefit payable by the employer
would become complete.
In reaching the conclusion that the entire amount payable by
the employer should be subject to gift tax, the IRS implicitly included two non-revelation events in the valuation process. First, it
included in the gift tax calculus the increase in the value of the benefit that accrued as the time remaining before the employee's spouse
would receive the death benefit became shorter-that is, each year,
the value of the benefit would increase by virtue of the time-value of
119 If, for example, the increase in the price per barrel of oil were $100, instead of $3, its
inclusion, as well as the inclusion of the oil-diamond conversion process, in the tax base would
distort the amount of the gift, rather than merely neutralize the deferral.
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money until, at the time of the employee's death, its value would
equal the amount payable by the employer. Second, the IRS also
included in the calculus any post-severance increase in the value of
the death benefit attributable to premature death.
To illustrate the effect of the IRS's inclusion of these non-revelation events in its valuation analysis, assume that a twenty-one-yearold employee executes a death-benefit agreement with his employer
such as the one described in the ruling. One year after executing the
agreement, the employee is a victim of a fatal accident. Assuming
that the employee is survived by a spouse, is still employed at the
time of death, and that his annual salary at death is $50,000-each of
which is a revelation event-the employee's spouse is entitled to receive $100,000, which, according, to the IRS, would be the amount
of the gift.
If, however, only the revelation events are taken into account
and the non-revelation events-i.e., post-severance increases in value
attributable to the time-value of money and the employee's premature death-are disregarded, the amount of the gift would be substantially less than $100,000. To calculate the amount of the gift
with only revelation events considered, one must determine the value
of the right to receive $100,000 at the end of the life expectancy of a
twenty-one-year-old. 1 20 Using the tables provided in the regulations,
the amount of the gift, stripped of both non-revelation events in the
120 In the estate tax context, premature death has been removed from the valuation process in a manner similar to that suggested in text. In Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S.
151 (1929), the decedent's will created a trust that provided that income was to be paid to the
decedent's widow for life and the remainder was to go to charity. The widow having died
prior to the filing of the estate tax return, the court had to decide whether the value of the
remainder, for charitable deduction purposes, was to be determined with or without regard to
the widow's premature death. The Court held that it was to be valued as of the date of the
decedent's death on the assumption, though it was known to be false, that she would live a
normal life expectancy. See also Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728 No. 48
(1982); Rev. Rul. 82-97, 1982-1 C.B. 138.
But Cf Shedd v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 394 (1961), afd, 320 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1963);
Commissioner v. Shiveley's Estate, 276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960). In both cases, the presence of
contingencies at the time of the decedent's death made it impossible to value certain claims
against the estate for I.R.C. § 2053 purposes. The courts determined the amount of the deduction by taking into account the facts that actually occurred after the decedent's death. In
effect, these post-death facts were revelation events in that their outcome merely indicated
what could not have been actuarially determined on the date of death. In contrast, the premature deaths that occured in Ithaca Trust, Van Home and Revenue Ruling 82-97 were postdeath facts of a non-revelation character-life expectancy was actually ascertainable on the
decedent's death, permitting valuation on that date without the need to take into account
any post-death events. This willingness to allow revelation events to affect the valuation process in the estate tax context may only have application when a § 2053 deduction is at issue.
But see note 114supra.

THE NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[February 1983]

manner suggested, is $8,954.121
In the year following the employee's severance of control over
the benefit, its value increases to $100,000 as the non-revelation
events occur: (1) Each day after severance, the employee's life expectancy grows shorter, and, concomitantly, the date of payment of the
benefit approaches, thereby increasing the value of the right to receive the payment by virtue of the time-value of money; and (2)
while, at the moment before the employee's accidental death, the
value of the benefit is still substantially less than $100,000, the employee's sudden, premature death triggers an immediate right to receive the payment, thereby precipitating an increase in value to
$100,000. Because this increase in value of $91,046 ($100,000-$8,954)
occurs in the post-severance period and is not attributable to the outcome of revelation events, it should be excluded from the transfer tax
base, just as post-transfer appreciation of gifts not subject to the valuation-difficulty rule does not affect the valuation process. In short,
no rationale supports including these non-revelation events in the
valuation process merely because difficult-to-value contingencies
make it necessary to defer the computation and payment of the gift
tax until the revelation events occur. The IRS's conclusion to the
contrary in Revenue Ruling 81-31 is inconsistent with transfer tax
policy concerning post-transfer events and should, therefore, be
rejected.
The non-revelation events, premature death and time-value of
money, having been stripped out, the taxpayer is taxed on the same
amount as if the death benefit had been a non-fluctuating $100,000
and not subject to any contingencies. The difficulty, of course, is that
while the taxpayer would be deemed to have made a gift of $8,954 on
the date he severed control if the death benefit is non-contingent, he
is deemed to have made a gift of this amount one year later, at the
time of his death, if the death benefit is contingent. To maintain
parity between the contingent and non-contingent arrangements, the
deferral must be removed. Since the inclusion of the time-value of
money in the valuation of a death-benefit plan would intrinsically
neutralize the deferral, 22 and since the preferable approach of im121 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9.
122 Assuming an interest rate of 10%, the value of the benefit would increase each year by
10% as a result of the time-value of money. If this increase were included in the tax base, the
amount of the gift tax payable would similarly increase by 10% each year. But see note 116
supra for a discussion concerning changes in the marginal tax bracket. Thus, so long as the

interest rate used in computing the post-transfer increase in the amount of the gift is approximately equal to the interest rate prevailing in the marketplace, inclusion of the time-value of
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posing an interest charge is not presently provided for in the Code, it
is perhaps sensible to require that the time-value-of-money factor always be embodied in the tax base, at least where a death benefit plan
123
is the subject of the gift.

Thus, in the context of death-benefit plans, and, perhaps, in the
context of many other gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule as
well, 24 inclusion of the time-value of money in the tax base will neutralize the deferral. t25 On the other hand, for those gifts subject to
126
the rule that do not automatically increase in value as time lapses,
an alternative approach must be taken, of which there are basically
four.
E. Available Alternatives
First, exclude all non-revelation events from the valuation process and amend the Code to provide for the imposition of an interest
charge. From the policy viewpoint, this is the most attractive alternative, since it closely approximates the tax treatment applicable to
gifts that are not too difficult to value. t27 But to achieve the equity
money in the tax base will neutralize the deferral. The tables in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-9
assume an interest rate of 6% and thus, in the present economy, would not sufficiently neutralize the deferral. Compare I.R.C. § 6601 (1982), which calculates an interest rate by
rounding to the nearest full percentage point the adjusted prime rate banks charged in September of the preceeding year.
123 Including the time-value of money in the tax base will neutralize the deferral for any
gift of a right to receive money or property in the future. This is so because as the time
remaining before the property or money is to be received grows shorter, the value of the right
to receive the property or money grows larger in accordance with an appropriate interest rate.
Many gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule involve the right to receive property or
money in the future. Indeed, in each of the rulings in which the IRS has thus far applied the
valuation-difficulty rule, other than Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, the subject of the gift
was the right to receive property or money in the future.
124 Id
125 It could be argued, however, that the deferral in Rev. Rul. 81-31 was neutralized by
the inflationary increases in the amount of the benefit--the benefit being equal to twice the
employee's salary at his death, the value of the benefit would increase as inflation increased
his salary--and therefore, it was inappropriate to include the time-value of money in the tax
base. Including the inflationary increases in the value of the benefit in the amount of the gift,
however, does not neutralize the deferral. Indeed, the use of an appropriate discount rate to
determine the present value of the benefit effectively eliminates the inflation from the
calculus. See note 113 supra.
126 See text accompanying note 117 sura.
127 This alternative would not create complete parity between gifts immediately capable
of valuation and those that are not. With respect to gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty
rule, post-transfer events of the revelation type would be taken into account, while no posttransfer event of any kind is considered for gifts not subject to the rule. This inequality in
treatment is necessary, however, if difficult-to-value gifts are to be accurately measured.
To illustrate, consider the death-benefit plan in Rev. Rul. 81-31. The employee's spouse
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offered by this alternative, Congress must act.
Second, "pick and choose" among the non-revelation events, including in the valuation process only those that approximately neutralize the deferral. The objective of this alternative is to create an
interest-charge effect without any interest-charge legislation. The
only criterion to be used in selecting among non-revelation events
would be whether or not the inclusion of the particular event in the
tax base would produce the proper amount of tax. A process such as
this-where the proper amount of tax to be paid is computed first
and then the tax base that will produce this tax is determined-is
antithetical to our system of taxation.
Third, exclude all non-revelation events from the tax base. In
the absence of an interest charge, this alternative treats gifts subject
to the valuation-difficulty rule more favorably by conferring on those
who make gifts of this type the benefits of deferral. The disparity
between gifts subject to the rule and gifts immediately capable of
valuation that is created by this alternative renders it unattractive.
The fourth alternative, which has been adopted by the IRS,
would include in the valuation calculus all non-revelation events. Although this alternative does deviate from general transfer tax policy
concerning post-transfer events more than the other alternatives, it
can be rationalized, perhaps, on the ground that its consequences,
which are generally adverse to the taxpayer, 128 are self-inflicted.
That is, the donor can choose to give an asset that is difficult to value
as easily as he can choose an asset immediately capable of valuation.
By selecting a difficult-to-value asset, the donor himself creates valuation doubts, which, since voluntarily created, ought to be resolved
was entitled to receive twice the annual salary he was receiving at death. In order to accurately measure the transfer, it was necessary to wait until the employee's death to value the
benefit. Obviously, increases and decreases in salary that might occur after he severed his
control over it were permitted to affect valuation. In contrast, gifts immediately subject to
valuation are measured as of the moment control is severed, with events occurring thereafter
having no effect on value.
128 See Rev. Rul. 81-31, 1981-1 C.B. 475; Rev. Rul. 75-71, 1975-1 C.B. 309. In both
rulings, the IRS concluded that the amount of the gift was equal to its value at the time
valuation first became possible. In neither ruling did the IRS strip out the non-revelation
event of premature death. Had the IRS stripped out this event, the amount of the gift would
have been less--although neither ruling contained sufficient facts concerning life expectancy,
making it impossible to determine whether, in fact, any premature deaths were involved.
Non-revelation events can, however, benefit the taxpayer in some instances. This will occur,
for example, where the value of the gift decreases during the period after control is severed
but before the difficult-to-value contingency attached to the the gift becomes susceptible to
valuation.
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against him. 29 The division of risk created by this alternative also
makes it attractive. Just as the taxpayer bears the risk that the inclusion of non-revelation events will result in subjecting post-transfer appreciation to tax, the government bears the risk that the inclusion of
such events will result in post-transfer depreciation reducing the
30
amount of the gift below its value on the day control is severed.
Finally, the inclusion in the tax base of post-transfer increases in
value, if approximately equal to the inflation rate, should neutralize
the deferral.

13

Since, however, some assets outperform inflation and other assets do not perform as well as inflation or suffer a decline in value
despite inflation, the first alternative, which, unlike the last alternative, provides an accurate measurement of value of the gift on the
date control is severed and which imposes an interest charge to neutralize the deferral, is preferable. 32 The first alternative being unavailable without the necessary legislation, however, the last
alternative is the least unacceptable one and should be applied to all
gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule--except, of course, to
gifts of a death benefit and similar items which, as suggested, should
be stripped of all non-revelation events other than the increase in
33
value attributable to the time-value of money.
VI.

Conclusion

The valuation-difficulty rule has generally been applied in limited contexts, namely, where the gift is the subject of an enforceable
129 Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 188-89 (1943).
130 See Macris, supra note 10, at 302, 303.
131 See note 118 supra.
132 Some administrative inconvenience does inhere in the first alternative. Indeed, some
have argued that it may be difficult to isolate and strip out the non-revelation events with
respect to some difficult-to-value gifts. See Macris, supra note 10, at 301-02. It should not be
too difficult, however, to classify contingencies on the basis of whether or not they are susceptible to actuarial valuation at the time control is severed, stripping out of the valuation process the outcome of those contingencies that can be immediately valued while allowing the
outcome of the difficult-to-value contingencies to affect value. For example, in Rev. Rul. 8131 there were five post-transfer events that might have affected value: (1) married status at
the time of death; (2) salary at the time of death; (3) employment at the time of death; (4)
time value of money; and (5) life expectancy. The last two were susceptible to actuarial
valuation at the time control was severed while the others were not. Thus, there would have
been no difficulty in isolating the last two factors as non-revelation events and treating them
appropriately.
133 It is certainly arguable that there is no basis under the Code to treat such gifts differently from all other gifts subject to the valuation-difficulty rule. While the argument does
have merit, it is suggested that the policy considerations discussed in the text dictate its
rejection.
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obligation or where the gift is one of rights arising out of a deathbenefit plan. Since application of the rule in these contexts does not
create tax avoidance potential, the improvement in valuation accuracy afforded by the rule has made this limited application salutary.
Extending the rule into other contexts can, however, produce
tax avoidance. To prevent taxpayers from enjoying this tax avoidance, two alternatives are available. First, apply the rule on a limited
basis-that is, only when application of the rule does not produce tax
avoidance. But, of course, this alternative fails to secure the increase
in valuation accuracy offered by the rule insofar as all other difficultto-value gifts are concerned. Second, apply the rule to all difficult-tovalue gifts, adopting a death-completion rule to forestall tax avoidance. This second alternative is, from the policy viewpoint, the preferable one, since it effects an increase in valuation accuracy for all
difficult-to-value gifts without permitting any tax avoidance.
Nevertheless, two deficiencies inherent in the rule must be
confronted.
First, to the extent that the rule requires that post-severance
events be taken into account in measuring the transfer, gift tax theory is violated. The significance of this violation is minimized, however, if, as suggested, only those post-severance events revealing what
was initially unascertainable are taken into account.
Second, the rule permits a deferral of the gift tax payment until
value becomes ascertainable, creating an inequitable advantage for
difficult-to-value gifts. To maintain parity with gifts not difficult to
value, an interest charge should be added to the gift tax imposed on
gifts subject to the rule.
Thus, the valuation-difficulty rule should be applied to all gifts
not immediately capable of valuation if: (1) an interest charge is imposed to neutralize the deferral; (2) only those post-severance events
of a revelation character are permitted to enter the tax base; and (3)
the death-completion rule is adopted to prevent tax avoidance.

